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Comment
BALTIMORE CITY'S DRUG TREATMENT COURT: THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN AN EMERGING FIELD
We punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure.1
-Michel Foucault
INTRODUCTION

In June 1989 the Dade County, Florida, Drug Court in Miami became the first court in the nation to systematically divert drug-addicted defendants into treatment programs. 2 Since the Miami court's
inception, the drug treatment court (DTC) idea has proven to be remarkably attractive to other jurisdictions seeking to deal with exceptionally high drug caseloads and the corresponding strain on the
criminal justice system's capacity to process drug cases.3 By creating a
unique, cooperative approach to drug cases, the Miami court held out
the possibility that the criminal justice system could efficiently and
cost effectively process drug cases, cut recidivism, re-establish links between the community and drug-addicted offenders, and rehabilitate
defendants through treatment.4
The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court began operations on
March 2, 1994, and celebrated the graduation of the first defendants
to complete treatment through the program on March 23, 1995.'
Now, after two full years of operation in the Baltimore City District
Court, the DTC is becoming increasingly familiar and routine to lawyers,judges, court personnel, and even to defendants.' Buoyed by the
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH-THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 22 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975).
2. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ-144531 PROGRAM BRIEF: SPECIAL DRUG COURTS 4 (1993) [hereinafter SPECIAL DRUG COURTS]. See infra
text accompanying notes 28-30, 34-41 for the definition of Drug Treatment Court.
3. SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 4. The Bureau of Justice Assistance reported that by mid-1993, there were at least 15 drug courts operating around the nation.
See also infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 4 (listing goals of special courts).
5. Interview with Maureen O'Leary, Assistant Public Defender for Baltimore City, Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court, in Baltimore, Md. (Feb. 28, 1995); see alsoJay Apperson, For 7 Grads, Tears, Hugs, and a New Life, BALT. SUN, Mar. 24, 1995, at B1;Jay Apperson,
Drug Court' Offers Treatment andJob Advice, notJal, BALT. SUN, Mar. 30, 1994, at BI.
6. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court (Jan. 16, 1996). In Baltimore City, the
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success of the DTC in the district court, a DTC for Baltimore City's
Circuit Court system began in October 1994, and became fully operational on March 6, 1995. 7
The Baltimore City DTC is considered to be on the cutting edge
in the region, but it is in fact part of the second wave of such courts
established in the nation. Indeed, there are at least thirty-five DTCs
operating in the United States.8 Several additional jurisdictions plan
to add a DTC to their systems. 9
Despite relatively frequent and generally favorable coverage in
the popular press, very little attention has been paid to the DTC phenomena from a theoretical perspective within the legal community.'"
This is surprising, as drug treatment courts currently appear to be the
most advanced rehabilitative setting in the American criminal justice
system and, moreover, these courts are a departure from the traditional adversarial system. Certainly both issues justify more widespread discussion.
One topic particularly neglected is the theoretical implications of
establishing a court focused on treatment as opposed to punishment.
Interestingly, DTCs have garnered a great deal of attention from corrections systems and the medical field, in particular the alcohol and
drug therapy community." To the extent that there is a guiding phitreatment courts, it is primarily therapeutic or medilosophy for drug
12
cal in nature.
district court has -jurisdiction over all cases where penalty is less than three years imprisonment or does not exceed a fine of $2,500 or both. It has concurrent jurisdiction with
circuit court in misdemeanors and certain enumerated felonies." THE BAR ASS'N OF BAITIMORE CITY, THE DRUG CRISIS AND UNDERFUNDING OF THEJUSTICE SYSTEM IN BALTIMORE CITY,

(1990) [hereinafter RUSSELL REPORT].
7. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, Chief of the Research and Development Division,
State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore City, in Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 19, 1995). In Baltimore City, circuit courts are "the highest courts of record exercising original jurisdiction
within the State." RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
8. Telephone interview with Carolyn Cooper, Director of the Drug Court Resource
Center, The American University (Feb. 28, 1995). This number is an estimate, as currently
there is no accurate survey of jurisdictions with Drug Treatment Courts. Id. Ms. Cooper
states that there may be as many as 40 operational DTCs. Id.
9. Id.
10. A computer search revealed 1696 mentions of "drug courts" in major newspapers.
Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS file (Jan. 16, 1996). In contrast, the term "drug courts"
generated 72 mentions in law reviews and journals and was the subject of only one full
article in the ABAjournal. Search of WESTLAW, JLR file (Jan. 16, 1996). However, researchers from both treatment and corrections perspectives have produced several studies
of treatment and security effectiveness. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 13-15.
11. See supra note 10.
12. In particular, there is an acute lack of legal philosophy regarding and discussion of
this subject in legal journals. See supra note 10. In contrast, the therapeutic and correcREPORT OF THE RUSSELL COMMITTEE 9
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The relative neglect of the theory underlying DTCs is explained
in part by the DTC planners' heavy concentration on practical matters.1 3 The people who are creating and operating DTCs are involved
in the challenging task of combining the divergent fields of medicine,
law, and corrections.14 This effort necessarily requires a focus on operational and practical matters at the expense of intricate theoretical
details.
Similarly, DTC practitioners are currently fighting both political
and funding battles.1 5 As a result, they may be unable to afford the
distractions of theory. Indeed, another practical reason for the lack of
a guiding legal theory is that such theories have become politicized in
recent years. 16 Thus, to the extent that DTCs receive funding from
government sources, they wish to be disassociated with theories that
have become controversial in the last two decades. Rehabilitative theories, which at first glance seem particularly apt for DTCs, have become particularly disfavored.' 7 Thus it is very tempting for DTC
proponents simply to point to graphs and statistics and to argue that,
theory aside, DTCs work. Proponents also note that DTCs have
gained acceptance in the therapeutic community and to some extent
in the corrections community.'" By focusing on the "hard" data that
has become available, proponents are thus tempted to leave the complex and polarizing issues of theory alone.
However, there are good reasons for exploring the theoretical
implications of DTCs. Perhaps the most obvious reason is to avoid the
mistakes of predecessors and to be able to show critics precisely how
tions communities have begun to develop bodies of work that are devoted to this topic.
Therefore, the lack of theory referred to here and throughout this Comment refers primarily to the lack of legal theory. See supra note 10. Nevertheless, there is room for greater
discussion of DTCs in all of the concerned fields.
13. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that successful implementation of special drug courts requires extensive pre-program planning, careful groundwork
with leaders of all the major agencies involved in criminal case processing, and strong
leadership); see also CAROLINE S. COOPER &JOSEPH A. TROTTER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1
DRUG CASE MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT INTERVENTION STRATEGIES IN THE STATE AND LO-

1-2 (1994) (explaining practitioners' reactions to volume of drug cases).
14. Interview with Judge Jamey Weitzman, District Court Judge for the State of Maryland, Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court, in Baltimore, Md. (Mar. 7, 1995).
15. 134 CONG. REc. H1659-64 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mfime). In
fact, funding has been a major concern for DTCs. The Baltimore City DTC is funded
through two federal grants, of which 25% of the funds are matching state funds. Interview
with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7. The Baltimore City DTC has put together a funding
package that will last through 1997. Id.
16. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 32-59 (1981).
17. Id.
18. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
CAL COURTS
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DTCs differ from such perceived failures of rehabilitative philosophy. 19 Adding a truly coherent legal philosophy to the practical and
therapeutic justifications already in place may serve to motivate proponents of DTCs and combat skepticism within the legal profession.
Finally, DTCs should be placed in a theoretical context simply for
the sake of knowledge and evaluation. A rational legal theory helps to
organize and frame questions raised by the existence of DTCs. Three
basic questions immediately come to mind: What is a drug treatment
court? What is it designed to do? How does it differ from other
courts? A very short and inadequate answer is implied in the court's
name. A "drug treatment court" is a court that uses coercive power
over persons (addicts) involved in some form of drug use, who come
into contact with the criminal justice system.2 ° It is designed to divert
addicted offenders from incarceration or other punishment into drug
primartreatment programs. 2 1 It differs from other courts by focusing
22
ily on treatment or rehabilitation rather than punishment.
This focus on treatment rather than punishment is the crux of
the DTCs, and it has spawned not only the political controversy surrounding the courts, but also their praise. Critics might ask, "If it does
not punish is it a court?" and "How can such a court be 'tough' on
crime?" Yet proponents would argue that this shift in focus is justified
by the need for fundamental structural change in the criminal justice
system's approach to drugs. Drug treatment courts represent a
marked departure from the adversarial system. Judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys cooperate as a team to find effective treatment
23
for a defendant and to ensure that the defendant stays in treatment.
The Baltimore City DTC, along with other DTCs, represents an
advanced rehabilitative option for the criminal justice system at a time
when rehabilitation theory is in decline. This Comment will examine
the philosophical roots of DTCs generally, focusing on how closely the
current practical philosophy of DTCs compares to traditional rehabilitation theories. In fact, DTC philosophy actually may be closer to theories of "social defense"-which encompass a blend of incapacitation,
deterrent, and rehabilitation theories-than to "pure" rehabilitation
theory. 24 The treatment-based arguments of Barbara Wootton espe19. See ALLEN, supra note 16, at 1-2 (discussing the decline in the rehabilitative ideal).
20. See infta notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
21. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the need for incarceration
alternatives).
22. See id. at 3-4 (explaining the emphasis on treatment).
23. See id. at 5 (listing cooperation of court personnel as critical to program planning).
24. See inffa notes 221-231 (discussing generally rehabilitationism and social defense).
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cially anticipate and resonate with the DTC movement.2 5 In addition,
this Comment will examine the DTC's relationship to and departure
from the adversarial system and some of the consequences that flow
from systemic restructuring of the court system. In particular the
roles of the judge, the prosecution, and the defense change dramatically in a nonadversarial system. Finally, the author considers some
likely scenarios for DTCs in the future.
I.

DRUG

TREATMENT COURTS

Drug treatment courts are a relatively unreported phenomenon
in the legal community.2 6 A particular problem is that there is no
currently agreed-upon definition of a drug treatment court.2 7 Part I
of this Comment will be devoted to background in the general development of DTCs. Section A sets out basic definitions, including a definition of DTCs. Section B gives a history of the DTC movement and
attempts to show how DTCs address the needs of an overburdened
criminal justice system. Finally, section C traces the history of the formation of Baltimore City's DTC and details current DTC operations
in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City.
A.

Terminology

1. Drug Court.-There are two general types of drug courts.2"
The term "Expedited Drug Case Management" Court (EDCM) refers
to a court that consolidates drug cases for more efficient processing
and management of cases. 9 The term "Drug Treatment Court" refers
to a court that supervises treatment for substance-abusing
defendants.3"
2. Expedited Drug Case Management Court.-An EDCM is a special
division of an existing trial court designed to consolidate a court system's drug caseload, concentrate expertise in one courtroom, and re3
duce the time to disposition through effective case management. '
25. BARBARA WooTrON, CRIME AND PENAL POLICY: REFLECTIONS ON FIFriyYEARS' EXPERIENCE 34-66 (1978) [hereinafter WOOTrON, CRIME AND PENAL POLICY].
26. See supra note 10.
27. COOPER & TROTrER, supra note 13, at 1.
28. This Comment follows the Bureau of Justice Assistance in making a treatment/
management distinction when discussing drug courts. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra
note 2, at 3.
29. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
31. The name for a management-style court follows the one used by the Bureau of
Justice Assistance. SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 11. Cooper and Trotter refer to
management courts as "drug court divisions." COOPER & TROTTER, supra note 13, at 9.
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These courts primarily have as their goal a reduction of the pending
drug caseload. 2 The primary difference between an EDCM and a
DTC is that the EDCM is focused on case management, whereas the
DTC is focused on treatment. Unlike DTCs, EDCMs continue to use a
traditional sentencing model.3 3
3.

Drug Treatment Court.34 -A

DTC is a special division of an ex-

isting trial court designed to divert drug-addicted offenders from a
system of penalties, such as incarceration, into a system of treatment,
such as a licensed program that specializes in helping a patient cope
with addiction. DTCs typically share several common characteristics.
First, DTCs establish eligibility criteria to identify defendants who will
be allowed to participate in the program.3 5 The eligibility criteria require the defendant to be an addict.3 6 The criteria may also include
requirements that the defendant must not be a violent criminal, nor a
security risk.3 7 Second, the DTC is a cooperative, nonadversarial system in which the criminal justice, correctional, and treatment systems
work together to find care for defendants and to ensure that they remain in treatment.38 Third, the DTC system provides designated
treatment slots for defendants.39 Finally, the DTC imposes a system of
predesignated sanctions on defendants who fail to comply with treatHowever, the terminology may imply a consolidation that could conceivably include a
DTC. For example, Baltimore City has three EDCMs that are unrelated to the DTC. Id.
32. SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 4.
33. See id. at 6 (describing the critical elements of EDCMs).
34. I use the term drug treatment court because that is the term that Baltimore City
uses to distinguish its DTC from its three EDCMs. THOMAS H. WILLIAMS, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, BALTIMORE CITY DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM, S.T.E.P. UP AND OUT 1 (1994). Cooper
and Trotter use the term "drug court." COOPER & TROTTER, supra note 13, at 19. The
Bureau of Justice Assistance uses the term "Dedicated Drug Treatment Court." SPECIAL
DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 10. Goldkamp uses the term "treatment drug court." JOHN
S. GOLDKAMP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT INNOVATION: THE DRUG
COURT MOVEMENT-A WORKING PAPER OF THE FIRST NATIONAL DRUG COURT CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 1993, 3 (1994).

35. WILLIAMS, supranote 34, at 6 (listing criteria that defendants in Baltimore City have
to meet in order to be eligible for the program).
36. Id.; cf. GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at 17-19 (noting that targeting of offenders is
fundamental and that courts should clearly delineate the stage of drug involvement at
which they seek to intervene). Note that the "disease" of addiction is best treated if the
patient is immediately treated. Jeffrey Tauber, TreatingDrug-Using Offenders Through Sanctions, Incentives, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1994, at 30 [hereinafter Tauber, Treating DrugUsing Offenders].
37. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 6.
38. THE OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATION, STATEJUSTICE INSTITUTE, FLORIDA'S TREATMENT BASED DRUG COURTS 7 (1993) [hereinafter TREATMENT BASED DRUG
COURTS].

39. GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at 8.
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ment programs.4 ° Sanctions, despite having punitive overtones, are
not designed primarily to punish, but rather to penalize program failure and to force a defendant to return to treatment.4"
4. Drug.-For the purposes of this Comment, the term "drug"
generally refers to a narcotic that is illegal to possess in the United
States.4 2 Treatment professionals agree that the term drug may also
be used to describe alcohol, nicotine, and even caffeine;4 however, it
would be very unlikely for a DTC to admit a person who is addicted
solely to alcohol, and certainly not to nicotine or caffeine.'W Frequently defendants admitted to a DTC are poly-addicted, meaning addicted to more than one drug including alcohol.4 5
5. Addict.-This term refers to an individual whose life
harmfully and overwhelmingly revolves around any drug, including
alcohol.4 6 In the disease model of addiction, this involvement is characterized by a "loss of control" over the use of drugs.4 7 For the purpose of this Comment, an "addict" is a person assessed by a DTC
intake unit and found to be an addict according to the intake
criteria."
40. Jeffrey S. Tauber, A Judicial Primer on Unified Drug Courts and Court Ordered
Drug Rehabilitation Programs, Address at the California Continuing Judicial Studies Program 6 (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Tauber, Ajudicial Primer] (transcript available from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics). Tauber explains that "smart punishment" relies on the
use of progressive sanctions whose intensity increases incrementally with the number and
seriousness of program failures. Id.
41. See id.
42. This definition is self-referential to the legal model. Reference to the legal model
is useful precisely because DTCs are concerned with treating substance abuse in populations that abuse illegal drugs.
There are several other definitions of the term "drug." SeeHAMID GHODSE, DRUGS AND
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR:

A

GUIDE TO TREATMENT

7-8 (1989) (listing various definitions for

"drug"). The definition developed by the World Health Organization is broad: "A drug is
'any substance that, when taken into the living organism, may modify one or more of its
functions.'" Id. at 7-8. From a medical perspective, a somewhat more amusing definition
is, "[a] substance which, when injected into a rat, produces a scientific paper." Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 13, 23-24.
44. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6.
45. GHODSE, supra note 42, at 30-33.
46. Bruce K Alexander, The Disease and Adaptive Models of Addiction: A Framework of
Evaluation, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION 45, 63 n.1 (Stanton Peele ed., 1988).
47. P. Joseph Frawley, NeurobehavioralModel of Addiction: Addiction as a PrimayDisease, in
VISIONS OF ADDICTION 25, 31 (Stanton Peele ed., 1988).
48. Typically the criteria for a determination of addiction use one of several possible
standardized tests. In Baltimore, the determination of whether or not an offender is an
addict is made before admission to the DTC. Baltimore City uses the Addiction Severity
Index (ASI) to make the determination. WILUAMS, supra note 34, at app. E. Most DTCs
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6. Treatment.-Treatment is the process of removing an addict's
physical and psychological dependence on a drug. Treatment is generally individualized to the level of the offender's need. 49 Although
most programs emphasize that the final result of treatment should be
a substance-free lifestyle, there are exceptions to this, such as methadone maintenance.5" The removal of a patient from physical dependance on a drug is referred to as "detoxification" or "detox."5 1
Detoxification may require direct medical supervision in a residential
52
setting.
7. Defendant.-Within the drug treatment court, a defendant is
typically referred to as a "client" by public defenders and treatment
personnel.5 Corrections personnel usually refer to a defendant as
the "offender." 54 Typically, the judge and prosecutor use the term
"defendant."

B.

55

History and Discussion of Early Drug Treatment Courts

Attempts to control and regulate the use of drugs in the United
States are longstanding and complicated. David Musto has demonstrated that the United States has repeatedly moved through cyclical
patterns of rising drug use, followed by increased public concern and
enactment of prohibitionary legislation, followed by periods of relative tolerance.5 6 Interestingly, the drug court movement began at the
height of the most recent popular anti-drug sentiment in the United
States. In 1986, following the emergence of crack cocaine, a renewed
"war on drugs" was declared by the federal government.5 The politconsider "addiction" to be a "disease." Tauber, TreatingDrug-UsingOffenders, supra note 36,
at 30.
49. See GHODSE, supra note 42, at 128 (discussing tailoring of treatment programs to
meet the individual's needs).
50. Methadone maintenance programs treat heroin addicts by replacing dependence
on one substance (heroin) for dependence on another (methadone). SeeJoyce H. Lowinson et al., Methadone Maintenance, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 550,
559 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 1992).
51. Frederick A. Ailing, Detoxification and Treatment of Acute Sequelae, in SUBSTANCE
ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 402 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 1992).
52. Id.
53. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 244-50
(expanded ed., Oxford University Press 1987) (1973).
57. STEVEN R. BELENKO, CRACK AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-DRUG POLICY 10, 13-15
(James A. Inciardi ed., Contributions in Criminology and Penology No. 42, 1993); see also
ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR 1-2 (1987) (explaining what happened in the
summer of 1986, when the "drug-war fever flashed higher than ever before").
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ical, legal, and law enforcement responses were necessarily tough because they occurred under a particularly high level of media
scrutiny. 58
In particular, two pieces of legislation, crafted in the election
years of 1986 and 1988, created conditions that required judicial and
correctional systems to begin rethinking the response to drug use.
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act5 9 defined drug abuse as a "national
security problem" and set the tone for a highly punitive response.6"
The federal government increased prison sentences for the sale and
possession of drugs, eliminated parole or probation for certain drug
offenders, and enhanced law enforcement activities. 6 Incentives were
provided for the states to do likewise. 62 The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse
Act 63 increased the tendency toward punishment and made clear that
substance abusers themselves (as opposed to the narcotics dealers)
would now be targeted. 64 First-time offenders convicted of possessing
five grams of a substance containing cocaine, for example, crack,
would be imprisoned for five to twenty years.65 At the same time, anticrack initiatives proliferated at the state and local level.6 6
The increased enforcement and sentencing efforts strained the
capacity of courts and penal institutions to the breaking point. 67 Even
prosecutors, perhaps the most enthusiastic supporters of the drug war
within the criminal justice system, reported concern about sharp, unexpected caseload increases.6 8 Consequently, practitioners began to
explore new systematic strategies to deal with the crushing
caseloads.6 9 Most practitioners focused on case-management techniques, evidenced by the EDCM courts. 7 ' At the same time, correc58. See BELENKO, supra note 57, at 9-21 (describing the media attention focused by the
introduction of crack cocaine).
59. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988)).
60. Id.
61. BELENKO, supra note 57, at 14.
62. Id.
63. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4231 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988)).
64. Id.
65. BELENKO, supra note 57, at 15.
66. Id. at 17-18.
67. James A. Inciardi, Introduction to 27 DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3
(James A. Inciardi ed., Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals 1993).
68. See BARBARA BOLAND & KERRY M. HEALY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE TO HEAW DRUG CASELOADS: COMPREHENSIVE PROBLEM-REDUCTION STRATEGIES
(1993) (reviewing initial responses of prosecutors).

69. Id.; SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
70. BOLAND & HEALY, supra note 68, at 7.

7
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tions personnel began to experience case overload as well."'
Although prison construction was relied on as a long-term solution,
alternative sanctions came to be viewed as a desirable tool to manage
offender populations in the short term. 72
Effective case management did create greater efficiency in the administration of justice in most cases.73 However, there remained a
sense in some jurisdictions that despite the new case-management
techniques, the criminal justice system was not addressing the heart of
the matter.7 4 Merely incarcerating drug users more efficiently did little to stop the cycles of recidivism that appeared to account for a majority of crime in these jurisdictions. 75 This inadequacy was
unsatisfying to reformers, and perhaps more importantly, to prosecutors and corrections officials, who repeatedly prosecute, incarcerate,
and release the same drug defendants back into the community.7 6
At the same time, the criminal justice profession was reevaluating
drug treatment programs.77 Studies in the late seventies and early
eighties indicated that drug treatment did not work. 78 Beginning in
the mid-eighties, new studies began to challenge this assumption.7 9
Treatment did seem to have some value as a correctional tool.8 ° First,
even if entry into treatment was coerced or forced, it showed positive
results. 8 ' In fact, positive treatment results were not dependant on
the form of entry into treatment; rather, results directly correlated
with the length of time in treatment.8 2 Second, other studies continued to point out a clear correlation between criminality and drug use.
As drug use decreased, criminality also decreased."
71. Id. at 7-8.
72. RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 29-30.
73. But cf. SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 13-15 (referring to multiple critiques
of special drug courts); BUREAU OFJUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, DRUG NIGHT

COURTS: THE COOK COUNTY EXPERIENCE 3-4 (1994) [hereinafter DRUG NIGHT COURTS]
(acknowledging concern for the efficiency and quality ofjustice in drug night courts).
74. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 1.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99 for a fuller discussion of the issues that led
to the creation of the DTC in Baltimore City.
76. RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.

77. Harry K. Wexler & Douglas S. Lipton, From Reform to Recovery: Advances in Prison
Drug Treatment, in 27 DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 209, 215 (James A. Inciardi
ed., Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals 1993).
78. Id. at 214.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. at 215-18.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 212-14.
83. Id. at 212.
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These two findings had very clear implications for a criminal justice system laboring under a cycle of recidivism. If treatment reduced
drug use, and reduced drug use resulted in lower criminality, then
treating drug addicts who passed through the criminal justice system
could reduce criminality, and not incidentally, the heavy caseload
weighing down urban courts.
Courts around the nation did have experience referring defendants to treatment.8 4 However, too often, treatment was dependant
upon the whim of the court and whether treatment funding was available. 5 When treatment funding was available, resources were
stretched to the breaking point and waiting lists stretched into months
and even years.8 6
Drug treatment courts addressed these problems by adopting a
"systems approach," integrating elements of the criminal justice, sub8 7
stance abuse treatment, public health, and correctional systems.
Their goal was to bring together the separate agencies to create a single system that would force defendants into treatment and keep them
there.8 8 Teamwork had come to the justice system.
C. Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court
The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court recently celebrated its
second anniversary. Thus, it has been operational long enough that it
is possible to begin to draw some conclusions from its experience.8 9
Because it was part of a second wave of DTCs, Baltimore had the advantage of designing a program with the lessons of other DTCs in
mind. The court was nevertheless an ambitious undertaking. It is. one
of the largest and earliest "two-track" courts in the nation, and one
with a colorful history.
1. Histoty.-As in other cities, the public success of similar
courts and, perhaps more importantly, the availability of federal appropriations under a block grant funding program 9° precipitated the
GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at 4.
85. See Tauber, Treating Drug-UsingOffenders, supra note 36, at 30.
86. See RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, 27 (discussing the overburdened treatment
programs).
87. Interview with Judge Jamey Weitzman, supra note 14; see also Tauber, A Judicial
Primer, supra note 40, at 13-15 (discussing "structural accountability").
88. Tauber, Treating Drug-Using Offenders, supra note 36, at 32.
89. Due to the relative youth of the DTC in Baltimore, the generalizations may not
perfectly reflect a "typical" drug court
90. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
50001, § 2201, 108 Stat. 1796.

84.
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formation of the Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court. 91 Yet the true
genesis of the DTC in Baltimore was a report, "The Drug Crisis and
Underfunding of the Justice System in Baltimore City," prepared in
December 1990 by a special committee of the Bar Association of Baltimore City, chaired by former Judge George L. Russell, Jr.9 2 The report of the Russell Committee (Russell Report) provided a compelling
description of a legal system under siege by drug-offender prosecutions.9 3 The alarm generated by this report among decisionmakers
prompted Baltimore to take advantage of increased federal funding,
as well as to lobby for increased state funding.9 4
The Russell Committee was charged with addressing "the problem of increasing drug litigation and the chronically underfundedjustice system in Baltimore City."95 The Committee's description and
analysis of Baltimore City's increase in drug prosecutions was stunning. For example, fifty percent of felony prosecutions in Baltimore
City were direct drug offenses, while eighty-five to ninety-five percent
of all felony prosecutions were drug-driven offenses.9 6 Fifty-five percent of all murders were drug related. 97 Even the casual observer
could recognize that the system was becoming increasingly incapable
of meeting its burden.
The Committee's more compelling conclusions were based on
other equally alarming facts: eighty percent of Maryland's prison population had a history of substance abuse; seventy-one percent of the
population at the city jail had served time there before; forty percent
of Baltimore City probationers violated their probations within a year,
primarily due to drug-related offenses; eighty percent ofjuvenile court
cases were drug related. 98 The conclusion was inescapable:
The appalling fact is that because the system fails through
lack of resources or resolve to effectively treat the problem of
drug abuse when the offender first encounters the system, the
same individualsreturn over and over again. To simply house these
offenders at great expense, is a short sighted and ultimately a prohib91. Telephone interview with Alan C. Woods III, Chief of the Research and Development Division, State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore City (Jan. 17, 1996).
92. RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6.
93. Id.
94. Interview with David W. Skeen, past president of the Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City,
member of the Russell Committee and Drug Treatment Court Committee, in Baltimore,
Md. (Mar. 6,1995).
95. RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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itively expensive and self-defeating approach to the problem. To
perpetuate an underfunded, ineffective, hurried and, on occasion unfair criminal justice system for which those subject
to the system have no respect, is little better than having no
system at all. 99
The Committee made five general conclusions and twenty-three
specific recommendations.10 0 One recommendation is particularly
noteworthy: "Whether one employs a cost benefit analysis or just
good sense, effective drug abuse treatment is the only answer to reducing
drug related criminal cases.""° ' The Committee specifically recomdrug courts" that
mended the study and establishment of "special
10 2
would divert first-time offenders into treatment.
2. Current Operation. 10 3 -Phase one of the Baltimore City DTC
began operations in district court on March 2, 1994.104 The program
is called "S.T.E.P.," for Substance Abuse Treatment and Education
Program." 5 On October 19, 1995, phase two operations of the DTC
began at the circuit court level. 10 6 Phase three, a special program for
probation violators, began on March 6, 1995, in the circuit court
DTC.'0 7 All three phases are designed to reach essentially the same
population-nonviolent addicts involved in criminal activity.108
Other than point of entry into the DTC system, which is determined
by the court to which a defendant reports, defendants from each
phase share the same treatment and supervision facilities.1 0 9
99. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 44-54.
101. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 47. The Russell Report is not only interesting for what it said, but also for
what it did not say. The report aggressively championed substance abuse treatment and
rehabilitation as a solution to the drug litigation problem. Yet there was little acknowledgment that while such a scheme may indeed reduce the volume of cases, making a decision
to move towards a rehabilitative system would have system-wide implications that would
reorganize not only the involved court, but to a large extent every organization or agency
that becomes involved with the DTC.
103. The transformation of the Baltimore City DTC from an idea in the Russell Report
to an actual working court is worthy of review, particularly the necessity for cooperation
and review of the motivations of the involved agencies. However, that topic deserves
greater attention than is possible here.
104. Interview with Judge Jamey Weitzman, supra note 14.
105. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at title page.
106. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
107. Id.
108. See WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 12-13 (describing the screening process); see also
PATSY CARSON, BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATrORNEY'S OFFmCE, DRUG TREATMENT COURT CIRCUIT COURT PROCESS & PROCEDURES 1

109. WILIAMS, supra note 34, at 18.

(1994) (listing criteria for program eligibility).

480

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:467

Upon entry into the criminal justice system, defendants who are
in jail or who are being supervised by Pre-Trial Services are screened
for program eligibility. Defendants' pending cases and prior convictions are examined, and defendants are excluded from the program if
their history demonstrates signs of violence, 1 ' if they are likely to flee
the jurisdiction, and based on their willingness to participate in the
program." 1 If the defendant passes the screening, the Public Defender's Office is notified.' 12 If the defendant is in jail, the Public
Defender (PD) assigned to the case attempts to visit the defendant to
explain the program."' The defendant is then assessed using the Addiction Severity Index (ASI), which identifies levels of need on a zero
to nine scale." 4 Essentially, the assessment is a determination of medical eligibility for treatment. 1 ' Finally, the defendant is assessed for
amenability to treatment on the Psychopathy Checklist Revised
(PCLR)." 6 Following assessment, the DTC assessor compiles and
sends files for eligible defendants to the Public Defender's Office and
the State's Attorney's Office. The attorneys assigned to the case then
review the files and agree to the terms of participation for the defend-

110. See supra note 108. Disqualifying criteria include convictions for violent crimes defined in the Maryland Annotated Code for which mandatory sentences are required. W1LLIAMS, supra note 34, at app. C. These criteria include violent felony convictions, domestic
violence in the past 15 years, assault, battery in the past 10 years, possession with intent to
distribute controlled dangerous substances and certain other serious drug charges, occurring within the last 5 years. Id. Other criteria include possession or use of a firearm in the
present offense, convictions for firearms within the last 5 years, and any record of child
abuse, rape, or sex offense. Id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (1957) (listing
crimes of violence for which mandatory sentences are required).
111. See supra note 108.
112. Private defense attorneys may practice before the DTC, but as a matter of practice,
the defendants brought before the DTC are represented by the Public Defender's Office.
Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann. supra note 6. Poverty is not required for an
offender to participate in the DTC. However, the DTC will seek reimbursement for costs
to the extent funds are available from the offender or an insurer. Interview with Alan C.
Woods IIl, supra note 7.
113. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 9. In actual practice, the Public Defender may not be
able to reach the defendant prior to trial for a variety of reasons, usually related to scheduling. The PD interfaces with the criminal justice system for the defendant, and so the PD's
explanation to the defendant is absolutely critical. See infrapart III for a discussion of the
adversary system.
114. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, app. E. The ASI measures the following needs medical,
employment/support, alcohol, drug, legal, family/social, and psychiatric. Id. Ultimately
the ASI is designed to elicit the offender's motivation for treatment. Id. at 8.
115. "Assessment" is different from "screening," which merely determines legal eligibility for the program. Interview with Robb McFaul, Assistant Program Director for Correctional Options, S.T.E.P., in Baltimore, Md. (Mar. 8, 1995).
116. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, app. E. The PCLR diagnostic instrument elicits behavioral
indicators associated with the criminality of the defendant. Id. at 9.
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ant." 7 The Public Defender interviews the defendant and explains
the terms and conditions of the agreement and ensures that he is
committed to participating."18
The Baltimore City DTC is somewhat unusual among DTCs, because entry into the DTC system is possible along two "tracks.""' Defendants who have relatively minor criminal records that would not
supportjail time in the pending case follow a "diversion" track.' 20 Defendants who complete treatment on this track will be granted a stet
by the prosecutor. 21 Until successful completion of the program, the
case is postponed procedurally.1 22 By postponing the stet, defendants
technically remain on active status for trial, and thus are1 23eligible for
supervision from the Pre-Trial Release Services Division.
Defendants who are eligible for the DTC, but have more considerable criminal records that make them ineligible for a stet will be
placed on a "probation track." 1 24 Defendants with relatively good
records may be offered a probation before judgment (PBJ),125
although this has not been common.1 26 The Baltimore City Parole
127
and Probation Unit supervises both straight probation and PBJ.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court (July 12, 1995).
120. WILUAMS, supra note 34, at 17.

121. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6. When a prosecutor
stets a case, the state declines to prosecute a case, but retains the right to reopen it within
one year for any reason. MD. R. 4-248 (1995). Thereafter, a stetted charge may be rescheduled for trial only by order of the court for good cause shown. Id. To be eligible for
a stet, the defendant must waive his right to a speedy trial. The advantage to a stet is that a
defendant will not have a conviction on his record. Telephone interview with Deborah
Hermann, supra note 6. In practice, cases are rarely reopened. Id. In DTC cases, the
prosecutor agrees that if treatment is successfully completed, he will not reopen the case.
Id.
122. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6. This practice is not
well-documented, but is followed by the Baltimore DTC. Id.
123. WILIAMS, supra note 34, at 18. The Division of Pre-Trial Detention and Services is
an agency of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. MD.ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 4-1403 (1957). This agency is tasked with following up on defendants who are
released, but require supervision. For the purposes of this paper, this agency may be
loosely compared to the parole and probation unit, except that it tracks and supervises
defendants before their trial.
124. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 2, 18.
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 641 (1957).
126. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6. Defendants who violate the terms of their probation may be referred to the DTC, which could be considered a
third track for purposes of entry. Id. However, once such defendants are admitted into
the DTC, they are handled in the "probation track." Id.
127. The Maryland State Division of Parole and Probation Agency is an agency of the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-602
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The Public Defender and the State's Attorney agree before going
to court on which track the defendant will enter. 128 They then agree
on a contract to be presented to the defendant, which details
the pro1 29
gram and includes possible sanctions for treatment failure.
In court, the judge explains the program to the defendant again
and offers a final chance to rescind.1 30 If the defendant accepts the
program by signing the contract created by the State's Attorney and
Public Defender, under normal circumstances he will go into treatment the next working day.'
Additionally, he will report back to the
32
judge on a regular schedule.1
Violations of the provisions of the DTC contract result in the im33
position of graduated sanctions that are written into the contract.1
These sanctions are designed to create immediate consequences for
the defendant and return him to treatment.13 4 In contrast to typical
probation, violation of the DTC contract, such as missing a meeting
with a supervisor, will not result in a charge of violation of
13 5

probation.

(1957). The agency supervises defendants who are placed on probation after trial as well
as defendants who are placed on parole after serving a sentence of incarceration. WIL-

supra note 34, at 18. A loose comparison with pre-trial services supervision is useful
for this Comment. Essentially the function of both agencies in the DTC context is to
match DTC defendants with treatment and to track and supervise defendants through the
treatment system. See text accompanying notes 119-123.
128. SeeWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 9-11 (describing agreement formation and program
entry).
129. See id apps. G, H. Possible sanctions for treatment failure include more frequent
urinalysis and shock incarceration. Id. Shock incarceration is usually the last step in a
series of graduated sanctions designed to force a defendant into compliance with the terms
of his contract. Tauber, A Judicial Primer, supra note 40, at 6. More specifically, shock
incarceration is a brief period of incarceration designed to force a defendant into entering
and remaining in drug treatment programs. Id. In treatment terms, shock incarceration is
intended to overcome "denial," which is a symptom of the disease of alcoholism. See RichLIAMS,

ard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245,

2297 (1992) (describing the denial symptom).
130. Telephone interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 91.
131. Id.
132. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 18.
133. Id. app. H at 3.
134. Tauber, Ajudicial Primer, supra note 40, at 6. Under a medical model of substance
abuse treatment, relapse is considered normal for substance abusers. See PETER FINN &
ANDREA

K

NEWLYN,

U.S.

DEP'T OFJUSTICE,

MIAMI'S

"DRUG COURT":

A

DIFFERENT APPROACH

9 (1993) (explaining that occasional lapses in sobriety are expected in the early phases of
treatment). Consequently the sanctions are designed to show the defendant that relapse
in the DTC has immediate and sometimes severe consequences. Tauber, A Judicial Primer, supra note 40, at 6.
135. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
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Various drug treatment programs13 6 provide outpatient treatment at three levels: intensive, enhanced, and standard.1 3 7 These
treatment levels vary slightly depending on the program.13 8 Intensive
treatment typically requires attendance five days a week, with some
form of case management, group therapy, and individual counseling. 39 Most DTC defendants receive this level of treatment when they
first enter the program. 1" Enhanced treatment typically involves
three visits per week consisting of group and individual therapy, ajob
search, and lectures.1 41 Standard treatment may consist of as few as
five hours per month or as many as two meetings per week, and
twelve-step program participation also may be required. 4 2 Each level
of care may require attendance at lectures and other programs. 43
Residential or inpatient treatment has not received funding; however,
DTC has provided residential treatment on an informal basis for a few
defendants." 4 Additionally, detoxification may occur in incarceration or in an inpatient or outpatient treatment setting in the
community. 145
II.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TREATMENT

What should society do with wrongdoers and outcasts? The en-

tire body of criminal law developed to answer this question, yet it bedevils us still. Certainly, there is some consensus that we punish those
who transgress society's laws. However, this merely begs the question
of what it means to cross these boundaries. Moreover, there are occa-

sions when one clearly transgresses societal boundaries but is not deserving of punishment.
Section A of Part II is a history of the development of the laws
that most affect addicts and a short discussion of the relationship between addiction and criminal law. This section will also begin to
frame a discussion of the concepts of addiction and treatment, while
136. WILLIAMS,
requirements).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.

supra note 34, at 23-27

(describing in

detail the programs'

140. Interview with Robb McFaul, supra note 115.
141. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 23-27.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Interview with Robb McFaui, supra note 115.
145. Telephone interview with Robb McFaui, Assistant Program Director for Correctional Options, S.T.E.P. (Jan. 16, 1996).
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noting some of the inadequacies exhibited by the traditional criminal
justice system in dealing with addicts.
Section B discusses both rehabilitative theory and social defense
theory. The social defense theory involves a blending of incapacitation and rehabilitation that stresses the protection of society from
criminal behavior. 4 6 The result is a model that in large part appears
to be based on a medical approach to offenders. Properly understood, this medical theory, described to its fullest extent by Barbara
Wootton, abandons punishment as a goal of the penal system. 14 7 Instead it emphasizes the treatment and eventual return of offenders to
society upon their cure. 4 DTCs sentence offenders to substance
abuse treatment, and this may be the fullest actual use of this treatment model in practice, if not in theory.
Section C relates drug treatment courts to theory. A precursor to
DTCs, the "Earn It" court of Quincy, Massachusetts, was an early attempt to create a rehabilitative legal setting that would benefit the
community in practice. 4 9 Similar to the "Earn It" court, the DTCs'
"systemic approach" realigns the goals of the criminal justice system
with community goals.15 ° This makes the court acceptable in practice
despite the decline of rehabilitative theory. This realignment generated important implications for the operation of DTCs that will be
discussed in Part III.
A.

Addiction and the Criminal Law

Americans have a long and fretful history of use and abuse of
drugs. As David Musto pointed out, drug use is not "un-American,"
but rather is peculiarly American. 5 ' By 1900, the United States had
as many as 250,000 addicts.1 5 2 Perhaps more important, scientific advances, including the development of the intravenous needle, allowed
for the refinement and eventual ingestion of ever purer narcotic extracts. 153 As the number of addicts grew, public fears also grew. The
146. See generally WooTroN, CRIME AND PENAL POLICY, supra note 25. See also BARBARA
WOOTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION (1963), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 164 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D.
McAnany eds., 1972) [hereinafter Woo-ON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION].
147. WOOTTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 164.
148. Id. at 168-69.
149. ANDREW KLEIN, THE EARN IT STORY (1980).
150. FINN & NEWLYN, supra note 134, at 10-12. The systemic approach also has implica-

tions for use as a model in areas other than addiction.
151. MUsTo, supra note 56, at 2-3.
152. Id. at 5. See supra notes 43-48 for a definition of addicts and addiction.
153. MUSTO, supra note 56, at 3-5.
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temperance movement in particular began to exert influence on popular opinion as early as the 1830s.'"I Ultimately, states began to pass
anti-narcotic legislation beginning in the 1860s. 111
Additionally, the use of narcotics came to be associated with
feared minorities. In 1900, the use of opium was associated with immigrant Chinese and cocaine was associated with "Negroes."15 6 Indeed, this stereotype holds true today. In State v. Russell 15 7 the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that sentencing guidelines providing
for disparate sentences between crack cocaine and powdered cocaine
were unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because the effect
of the disparity was to discriminate against predominately black users
of cocaine. 58 The Russell case illustrates the idea that crack cocaine is
used primarily by inner-city African-Americans.
Moreover, the medical profession, which was responsible for a
great deal of the overuse of narcotics, 159 also began to pay more attention to the phenomenon of addiction. 6 ° Fear of addicts and addiction, along with concern for the welfare of the addicts, led to
legislation at the state level by the 1890s.16 1 Federal action was somewhat delayed but more sweeping. The Harrison Act was passed in
1914,162 the Eighteenth Amendment, was passed in 1919,16" and the
Marihuana Tax Act was passed in 1937.164 Although Prohibition was
repealed in 1933,165 the effect of the Nineteenth Amendment and
subsequent legislation, as well as the development of criminal law, was
ultimately to ban not only the sale of controlled substances, but also
their possession.16 6
154. STANTON PEELE, DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDICTION TREATMENT OUT OF CONTROL

37 (1989).
155. Musro, supra note 56, at 91.
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. 477 N.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Minn. 1991).
158. Id. at 889. In a similar vein, the U.S. Supreme Court recently heard arguments in a
case in which African-American defendants charged the government with selectively prosecuting them in federal court for crack cocaine offenses. United States v. Armstrong, 48
F.3d 1508 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
159. Musro, supra note 56, at 92-94.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 91-92.

162. Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), repealed by Controlled
Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1291 (1970).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, importation, and exportation of intoxicating liquors.
164. The Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4775 (1954), repealed by Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292 (1970).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
166. Musro, supra note 56, at 11.
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Defining drug-related crime has proven difficult over the years.
However, a four-tier system proposed by Shellow clearly defines types
of drug-related crime.1 6 7 First, certain crimes are committed as a direct result of the consumption of drugs.' 68 Second, some crimes exist
solely because there is a law that prohibits drug possession.16 9 These
crimes are drug-defined.1 70 Third, there are drug crimes that are
1 71
committed to further the manufacture and distribution of drugs.
Fourth, there are crimes that are committed by drug users to further
their consumption of drugs.'77 These crimes
may include anything
1 7
from burglary to drug sales to prostitution. 1
Addicts may be involved in all four types of crime. The last category is of particular concern to DTCs because addicts are most likely
to enter the criminal justice system through the commission of crimes
to further their use of drugs.'77 As noted above, eighty percent of the
Maryland prison population has a history of substance abuse.' 7 5 Even
more alarming, a one year study of 573 Miami narcotics users showed
they had committed nearly 6000 robberies and6 assaults, 6700 burgla17
ries, and 46,000 larcenies and fraud offenses.
This phenomenon has long been a source of frustration for the
criminal justice system. A class of people, clearly identified, are
known to commit an exceptional proportion of crimes. We return to
the question that begins this section, what should society do with these
wrongdoers and outcasts? In California, attempts have been made to
simply outlaw addicts and addiction. However, in Robinson v. California,17 7 the Supreme Court held that addict status cannot in itself be a
criminal offense.' 7 The Court found that there must be some act or
omission of will to subject individuals to criminal liability.' 79

167. James C. Weissman, Understandingthe Drugs and Crime Connection, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DRUGS 44 (James C. Weissman & Robert L. DuPont eds., 1982).

168. Id.
169. Id. at 45.
170. Id.
171. ld.

172. Id.
173. Id. at 44-45.
174. Id.
175. RUSSELL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.

176.
177.
178.
179.

Boldt, supra note 129, at 2311.
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 666.
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One widely held medical model of addiction, addiction as a disease,1 8 ° highlights the problems facing criminal law. The medical
model originated from the study of alcoholism, but now has been applied to other forms of addiction, including narcotics addiction.' 8 1
Although there are varying definitions of the disease, the most basic
proposition, and the proposition important to DTCs, is that addiction
is behavior by an individual that shows a "loss of control" in the ability
to avoid or regulate the use of narcotics.18 2
A rudimentary sketch of four traditional penal theories will serve
to illustrate some of the problems encountered due to this medical
model of compulsive behavior. Incapacitation is usually justified on
the grounds of preventing harm to the defendant or others as a result
of the defendant's possible future criminal behavior.' 8 " Thus, assuming the truth of disease theory, the incapacitation of addicts still would
be a desirable outcome in order to prevent harm. 184 However, implicit in the definition of crime is that the defendant's behavior typically requires intent. 85 Under the disease theory, the addict may not
have committed a crime, either because the addict is deemed incapable of forming intent when intoxicated, or because the addict's intoxication is an involuntary act and is therefore excused.1 86 If either
alternative is true, then the defendant has not committed a crime and
is not eligible for incapacitation. In addition, incapacitating a blameless individual will not stop that individual from behaving under the
compulsion. 187 After the period of incapacitation is over, the individual still has the compulsion and thus the problem is not truly
solved. 188
Likewise, approaches from a retributive standpoint emphasize
the assignation of blame. 8 9 Punishment is assigned because society
deems it is just and deserved. 9 ° Sentencing under this theory re180. See HERBERT FINGARETrE, HLAvv DRINKING, THE MYrH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE
13-29 (1988) (providing an overview of the disease concept); see alsoAlexander, supranote
46, at 46-47, 55-56.

181. FINGARETrE, HEAW DRINKING, supra note 180, at 7.
182. Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOzO L
REv. 393, 397-99 (1988).

183. Id. at 440.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 409; see also RICHARD A. WASSERSTEN, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1967),
reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEws, EXPLANATIONS, ANDJUSTIFICATIONS 19 (Ru-

dolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
186. Nemerson, supra note 182, at 409-10.
187. Id. at 411-14.
188. Id. at 440.
189. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 66.
190. Id.
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quires that punishment be proportional to culpability. 19 1 Where a defendant is blameless, punishment is not justified. 92
Deterrent theory provides that punishment is necessary to deter
others from committing crime.19 If, however, an addict has a disease,
in the strictest sense of the disease theory of addiction, the compulsive
behavior is undeterrable 9 4 Thus, punishing an addict will not serve
to deter that addict or other addicts from committing crimes. 9 5
Rehabilitation may be described as an effort to change the behavior, character, and attitude of offenders through the penal system 9 6
Classical rehabilitation theory fails because mere imprisonment or
punishment are not treatments for addiction. 9 7 Modified or mixed
versions of rehabilitation generally emphasize some degree of criminal behavior and intent, but as with incapacitation,' 9 8 this conceptualization founders on the disease concept and the necessity of blame. If
a person is not at fault, then reform is not necessary.1 99
If addicts are indeed under a compulsion to take narcotics, then
they are blameless for the crimes they commit. Yet the criminal justice system has repeatedly shied away from following this logic to its
eventual outcome, lack of guilt.20 0 This tension has been inadequately resolved, and indeed Richard Boldt suggests that the question
is unresolvable. 0 1 He states that the criminal law, which is oriented
towards assignment of responsibility and blame, ordinarily requires
punishment of some sort. 20 2 In contrast, the medical model of treat-

191. Id.
192. Id.

193. CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, ANDJUSTIFICATIONS 4 (Rudolph
J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT].
194. Nemerson, supra note 182, at 434-35. Some will argue that deterrence of compulsive behavior is not necessarily an either/or proposition. Perhaps an addict's behavior is
moderately deterrable; this is clearly possible. However the argument is illustrative of a
relatively narrow point: that deterrence founders if a strict definition of addiction as a
disease is applicable.
195. Id.
196. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 2.
197. Nemerson, supra note 182, at 441.
198. See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
199. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 66.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (indicating that Congress could punish addicts for the crime of possession of narcotics, even if addicts were in
fact suffering from a disease), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
201. Boldt, supra note 129, at 2305.
202. It should be noted that, to some extent, each theory has developed utilitarian components to help the theory to overcome the concerns raised above. Utilitarianism, very
generally, states that punishment may be imposed where the good of the punishment,
whether incapacitative, retributive, deterrent or rehabilitative, outweighs the evil effects of
the punishment on the individual. Accepting the disease theory, this logic essentially cre-
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ment avoids assignation of blame and concentrates on relieving symptoms.10 3 A pure disease concept of addiction would require that
addicts not be liable for crimes committed as a result of the disease.20 4
B.

The Therapeutic Ideal

The caricatures of rehabilitative and punitive therapy in the preceding paragraphs are meant only as the briefest illustration of the
difficulty of dealing with compulsive or addictive behavior. In fact,
each of these theories has, in some form, reached an accommodation
for compulsive behavior. One accommodation, as suggested by the
Boldt model, is for the criminal law to presume the existence of free
will and responsibility.20 5 This presumption may be overcome in limited circumstances.20 6 As a practical matter, the presumption of responsibility may make a great deal of sense on utilitarian grounds.
Additionally, this approach may help satisfy the concerns of skeptics of
the disease theory, such as Stanton Peele2 °7 and Herbert Fingarette.2 °8
Incapacitation theory, in particular, benefits from this presumption of responsibility. Clearly, individuals who are abusing drugs represent a danger to the community. By assuming the posture that
addiction is not a disease, society can more easily detain such individuals. This results in the practical lessening of danger to the whole.
In contrast, rehabilitation theory has provided a more complete
framework for a frontal approach to addiction. The "rehabilitative
ideal" has been defined broadly as "the notion that a primary purpose
of penal treatment is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and
behavior of convicted offenders, so as to strengthen the social defense
against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and
satisfaction of offenders." 20 9 Implicit in this definition is the idea that
the behavior, character, and attitude of convicted offenders are malleable and can be reshaped. 2 10 More important, the belief that the use
ates strict liability for addicts who are incapable of avoiding these crimes. For example, we
punish because the good of punishment outweighs the evil we do to the addict. See gmer-

ally Nemerson, supra note 182, at 434.
203. Boldt, supra note 129, at 2306. Presumably, this rejection of blame results from the
scientific presumption that one's "choice" is predetermined by a combination of factors
largely beyond human control. Id. at 2304.
204. Nemerson, supra note 182, at 414.
205. Boldt, supra note 129, at 2304-05.
206. Id.
207. PEELE, supra note 154, at 3.
208. FiNGARETrE, supra note 180, at 13-28.
209. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 2.

210. Id. at 11. Incidentally, this idea necessarily includes the ability to reshape the population at large. Thus, some of the more recent manifestations of public relations cam-
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of the state's coercive powers can effect this change is also
necessary."'
Allen notes that this formulation of the rehabilitative definition
leaves questions of causation untouched."
In fact, both those who
have argued that crime is a chosen expression of free will and those
who argue that crime is determined either biologically, sociologically,
or by a combination of both factors, have argued in favor of some
aspects of rehabilitation. 3 The lack of emphasis on causation is particularly important to this discussion because, unlike other penal theories, the necessity of blame is also diminished.2 1 4 Thus rehabilitative
practitioners have felt free to use or to discard the concept of blame as
necessary, sometimes even within the same program.21 5
The DTCs themselves provide an example of this dichotomy. Offender addicts are considered to have committed their crimes, at least
in part, due to the disease of addiction. Regardless of the addicts'
blame, or lack of blame, for their actions, the DTC seeks to reshape
the offender's behavior from addiction and irresponsibility to non-use
and accountability. Offenders are required to take charge of their
lives by confronting addiction.
This process typically requires offenders to admit that they have a
problem. 6 In treatment terms, they overcome "denial." This process includes making up for past wrongs, including admitting to guilt
or fault for those wrongs, and perhaps providing court-ordered restitution to victims.217 However, despite an occasional reference back to
the behavior that required the defendant to enter the DTC in the first
place, the DTC treatment process essentially focuses on present and
future behavior patterns of offenders. The process is therefore one of
accountability as opposed to blame in the traditional retributive sense.
In the retributive sense, blame is a means of determining the amount
of punishment an offender receives. In the DTC sense, blame is a tool
to change the behavior of an offender. As an offender becomes more
paigns to end drug use such as the "just say no" campaign could be seen as rehabilitative in
their own right. More recently, the "character counts" movement to teach character in
schools relies on the malleability of children to take on various ideals.
211. The idea that rehabilitation is an important part of state policies traces its lineage
to the ancient Greeks. Id. at 4.
212. Id. at 3.
213. Id.
214. Nemerson, supra note 182, at 441.
215. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 3.
216. See Nemerson, supra note 182, at 407-08 (describing denial).
217. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 119. The process of accountability, admitting guilt, or making restitution is often the first step into the DTC.
Thus the admissions become a tool to get defendants to acknowledge their addiction.
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self-motivated, the system may choose to re-focus away from, or even
discard, constant reminders of blame.
The analogy of crime as a disease is not new to rehabilitation theory. Aristotle spoke of punishment as "a kind of cure," while nineteenth century Americar writings often referred to prisons as "moral
hospitals.""' The appeal of this type of theory is relatively obvious in
comparison to other formulations of penal theory. Instead of mere
concern with the behavior of convicted offenders behind the walls of
prison, rehabilitative theory addresses the relationship of offenders to
society at large and details ways of reintegrating offenders into society." 9 The modern dominance of the rehabilitative ideal is associated
with a number of innovations in legal and court systems. For example, Francis Allen cites juvenile courts, indeterminate sentencing, systems of parole and probation, youth authorities, therapeutic
programs in prison, juvenile institutions, and mental hospitals as being closely associated with the rehabilitative ideal.2 2 °
Rehabilitationism places great faith in the malleability of human
nature when presented with the proper opportunity and motivation to
change.2 ' Thus, in a "pure" version of rehabilitation, the focus of the
criminal justice system is on changing prisoners' behavior and contributing to their welfare. 222 Indeed, the institutions mentioned
above were originally designed for the benefit of the offender, subsequent criticism notwithstanding. The juvenile courts, for example,
were intended to shield youthful offenders from the harshness of the
criminal law.223 Indeterminate sentencing was designed with the idea
that offenders were to be treated as individuals and that shorter
sentences were appropriate for those who could be shown to be
reformed.

22 4

Social defense theorists, no less than other more punitive theorists, criticized rehabilitative theory for its central focus on the criminal offender. 2 5 In their view, emphasizing the offender's
rehabilitation over society's safety posed unnecessary risks to society
218. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 4, 92 n.1l.
219. See id. at 2 (describing how rehabilitative theory concerns itself with changing offenders' behavior and contributing to their welfare and satisfaction).
220. Id. at 6.
221. Id. at 11.
222. Id. at 2.
223. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1966).
224. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 16-17.
225. Marc Ancel, New Social Defense, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, ExPLANATIONS,

ANDJUSTIFICATIONS 132 (RudolphJ. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972)

[hereinafter Ancel, New Social Defense].
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and individuals."2 6 Therefore, in contrast to the rehabilitationists, social defense theorists chose a community-centered framework. Rather
than merely releasing an offender into the community, offenders
need to be "neutralized," preferably through a treatment program,
but through incapacitation if necessary. 22 7 Only then could appropri22 8
ate treatment of the offender follow.

This reorientation of viewpoints produced a startling shift in results. Instead of worrying about the welfare of the criminal, social de2
fense theorists worried about the danger of the criminal to society. 1
They argued that the "dangerousness" of the criminal offender must
somehow be measured, and subject to this measurement the criminal
offender must be controlled through state intervention.23 ° Only after
state intervention did social defense theorists begin to consider the
rehabilitation of the offender.2 3 1
This focus on crime prevention through the incapacitation and
reform of individuals sharply contrasts the deterrence model of punishment. Deterrence, with its concept of guilt, is aimed at persuading
all individuals to refrain from committing crime. 232 The approach is
concerned only with the individual offender to the extent that the
offender is dissuaded from committing additional crime. Social defense theory is aimed at stopping the individual first through incapacitation and second through -rehabilitation. 3 In fact, social defense
theorists do not speak about punishment at all; rather, they speak of a
2 34
system of "responsibility."
Barbara Wootton represents the theoretical apogee of the social
defense movement. Wootton argued that it is impossible to distinguish between diminished responsibility and "wickedness."2 35 Under
her formula, the mere fact that an individual has transgressed a societal boundary shows that he did not resist untoward impulses. 23 6 This

226. See CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 193, at 130 (comparing conflicting
goals of rehabilitation and social defense theories).
227. Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 138.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 193, at 130.

Id. at 4, 93.
See supra notes 225-231 and accompanying text.

WoorTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 170. See generally id. at 164-74.

235. Id. at 167-68.
236. Id. at 168.
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first question, the actual fact of transgression, would continue to be
decided traditionally by the courts."3 7
For Barbara Wootton, the more interesting question is whether
the individual could have resisted the impulse. In other words, is he
"responsible" for the transgression?2 . Barbara Wootton suggested
that there cannot be an answer to this question, because there is no
reliable criteria to distinguish between the two categories. Wootton
explained how "the step between 'he did not resist his impulse' and
'he could not resist his impulse' was one which was incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori .

.

. , there is no scientific measurement of the

degree of difficulty which an abnormal person finds in controlling his
impulses."2" 9 The proper approach to a prisoner, therefore, is "treatment which experience suggests is most likely to evoke the desired
response."2 40 Wootton thus recommended that the distinction between criminal justice and the medical system must "wither away. "241
This approach grants extreme discretion to treatment personnel.2 4 2 A
"sentence" is highly indeterminate and presumably dependant on the
24
progress the offender makes in treatment.
Thus, under traditional theory, if the individual is "not responsible," 2 then it is appropriate for the individual to be placed in an
institution for treatment of the underlying lack of responsibility.
However if the individual is "responsible," traditional theory then begins the process of blame and punishment. In contrast, under Wootton's formula, determining the exact nature of responsibility is
impossible. If the transgression was committed, responsibility is overlooked and the question then becomes one of treatment.
As with the utilitarian view of deterrence theory, this model
would not require actual guilt of an offender. 24 5 A mere finding of
237. Id. at 170. The terminology on this point is somewhat difficult. Use of the word
responsibility here creates confusion when "responsibility" is used in the more narrow
sense of the capability to resist or not to resist the impulse to commit a crime. Barbara
Wootton suggests use of the word "instrumentality" rather than "responsibility" to mean
the actual physical criminal act. Id. Although awkward, no other word seems to quite
capture the difference between the two concepts.
238. Id. at 170-71.
239. Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 172.
241. Id. at 169.
242. Id. at 171-73.
243. Id. at 173.
244. See supra note 237 (discussing the narrow meaning of "not responsible" when considered as part of Wootton's theory).
245. Under a utilitarian view of deterrence theory, a person does not need to be actually
guilty to achieve a deterrent effect. The fear of punishment, coupled with actual punishment when crime is committed, is enough to deter others from committing crime. See
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dangerousness could be enough to require intervention. 2 46 A system
such as this might be abused for political reasons or for profit; consequently, this model has been highly criticized.2 47
In recent years, rehabilitation theory has been heavily criticized,
contributing to its decline in popularity and usefulness amongst penal
theorists. 248 As may be expected, there are numerous reasons for the
decline in rehabilitative goals. In fact, the complaint that led in part
to the formulation of the social defense theory-that rehabilitation
was too centered on the offender and not concerned enough about
the community-was certainly among the reasons for its decline. 4 9
One might have expected that Social defense would begin to fill the
void: however, this generally has not occurred.
Many of the same problems that contributed to the decline of
rehabilitation negatively impacted social defense theory as well. For
example, social defense and modern expressions of rehabilitation
have become highly linked to therapeutic intervention and
medicine. 25" Thus, in some measure, a decline in rehabilitative theory may be linked to a decline in the esteem in which mental therapy
was held. 2 1 More important, there was a serious debate, which continues today, about whether corrections officials, mental health professionals, or any other officials, actually are capable of affecting the
behavior of offenders.2 5 2
At the same time, concern about the performance of the criminal
justice system in an era of rising crime rates brought tremendous scrutiny upon the reigning model of rehabilitation. 2 1' As a result of rising
crime rates and the war in Vietnam, criminal theory underwent a
politicization in the 1960s that created skepticism toward indeterminate sentences. 254 Thus, on one side, the granting of wide sentencing
discretion to judges, to parole boards, and certainly to treatment personnel came to be regarded by some as subject to abuse.25 5 This "libsupra note 193, at 93; cf. Francis A. Allen, The Morality of
Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 737, 747 (1981) (discussing
the absence of strict liability in criminal law).

CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT,

246. CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 193, at 129.
247. HELEN SILVING, THE DUAL-TRACK SYSTEM: PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION (1961), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 193, at 140.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

ALLEN, supra note 16, at 1-2, 29-30.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 30, 35.
Id. at 30-31, 36-37.
Id. at 67.

1996]

DRUG TREATMENT COURT

eral" critique256 is grounded in the belief that the power of the state
must be checked. 5 7 This concern with the containment of state
258
power extends to the courts and to the discretion of the judiciary.
On the other side, "conservative" critiques are marked by the belief that either the nature of human beings is immutable and thus not
capable of being rehabilitated, or that the expense of rehabilitation is
too high for society.25 9 This translates into several strains of criticism.
Retribution with an emphasis on punishment allows conservative theorists to express a moral code.2 6 ° At the most extreme end of the
conservative spectrum are those that propound a "war" theory, which
is characterized by repressive penalties and philosophies that encourage a view of criminals as apart from the society.2 6 ' This "us
against them" system creates the impression that rehabilitative regimes are weak.26 2
As we shall see, courts that have been able to align with community goals, usually by expressing a concern for restitution or safety,
generate popular support.26" This is particularly helpful in a climate
in which the retributive and war theory critiques seem to be setting
the current popular political agenda. 2 " Nevertheless, it is the liberal
critique that may prove to be troublesome for the drug treatment
5
26

court.

The main thrust of the liberal critique is against the symbol of
rehabilitationism, the indeterminate sentence. 266 However, this sentencing practice is particularly useful because it allows offender reform programs to operate on an individual level. The value of the
indeterminate sentencing may be described best in a minor debate
that has taken place within the Baltimore City DTC.
256. The use of the term "liberal," as opposed to "libertarian," is meant to convey a

sense that the critique is based not only in a traditional liberty interest, but also raises
concerns about equality in sentencing.
257. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 67.
258. Id.
259. Id.

260. Id.
261. Id. at 62-63 (noting war theory's relation to ancient Germanic concepts of
.outlawry").
262. Id. at 64. Interestingly, the drug war has moved through phases that may be considered an outgrowth of a general war theory of punishment. Thus, periods of the drug war
have been characterized by an emphasis on repression through policies such as "zero tolerance." See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
263. See infra text accompanying note 310.
264. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
265. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 44-45.
266. Id. at 67.
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As noted above, offenders in the diversion track are given the
promise of a stet upon completion of treatment and are given continual postponements in the stet docket until they complete the program.2 6 7 Concerns have been raised that this is not enough of an
incentive to keep the offender in the program. In reality, offenders
who are placed on the diversion track are very unlikely to face jail
time. 26 However, in the DTC program, failures to adhere to the DTC
contract could result in sanctions as serious as shock incarceration. 6 9
This punishment is actually more serious than the one defendants
would have faced if they had not joined the program.2 70
If the defendant is simply placed on the stet docket, the cases
frequently become difficult to prosecute. Witnesses may move, become uncooperative, or simply begin to forget the details of the case.
In contrast, defendants on the probation track have a guilty judgment
against them. If they do not complete the program, their probation
may be violated and they may face jail time. 271 Alan Woods of the
Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office illustrated the differences in
offenders' behavior between the two tracks:
The probation track defendants are noticeably more cooperative than diversion track defendants. They have the sword
of Damocles hanging over their heads. In contrast, we're saying to the diversion track defendants, "If you mess up we'll
hang the sword of Damocles over your head in the future."
Except that if we need to hang the sword, frequently we can't
find either the sword or the thread.2 7 2
To solve the problem, some members of the DTC have proposed requiring diversion track offenders to stipulate 273 before the court to
certain facts.2 74
267. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
269. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 19, app. 4 at 3; see also supra note 129 and accompanying
text.
270. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
271. It is possible that defendants in a probation track could serve more time in jail by
opting for the DTC than if they had taken a straight probation.
272. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
273. A stipulation is "[t]he name given to any agreement made by the attorneys engaged
on opposite sides of a cause, (especially if in writing), regulating any matter incidental to
the proceedings or trial, which falls within theirjurisdiction." BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARv 984
(6th ed. abr. 1991). When a defendant stipulates to the state's version of the facts, the
defendant cannot later directly contest this version of the facts and would likely be convicted if brought to trial.
274. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
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Effectively, this proposal would require the stet defendants to admit to guilt as a requirement for entry into the DTC. These defendants would be at risk of receiving more time in jail through the DTC
process than they would normally face. This high level of discretion is
what most concerns liberal critics.2 75 More precisely, liberals criticize
the possibility of unrestrained, arbitrary, or discriminatory abuse of
discretion. 27 6 Although treatment is acknowledged as the goal, because discretion actually resides in the hands of the judicial system,
which is charged with the safety of society, punishment disguised as
treatment is the result. 27 7 In fact, the indefiniteness itself is cited as a
component of additional punishment resulting in dehumanization
and depersonalization of the defendant. 27 8 Additionally, the expansion of discretion is problematic to liberal critics who are concerned
about the containment of state power.2 79
The DTC response is two-fold. First, the defendant is engaged in
treatment, and in the long term, time in jail may be the key to the
defendant's recovery. 28 ° Particularly in relationship to the disease theory of addiction, such measures are necessary to break through the
mechanism of denial and to institute a feeling of responsibility in
otherwise unresponsive defendants. 81 Second, discretion is expanded slightly, but this cuts both ways. Defendants may end up with
a better deal.28 2 Also, the Baltimore City DTC limited judicial discretion in some notable ways. In particular, defendants are assessed using the Addiction Severity Index, 8 and thus only appropriate
candidates are brought before the judge. Second, although not required to do so, the judge almost always follows the recommendations
of treatment providers.2 8 4

275. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 75.
276. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM.,

STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE:

A

REPORT ON CRIME AND

PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27 (1971).

277. Id. at 26.
278. Id. at 29.

279. Id. at 46.
280. Roger H. Peters, Drug Treatment in Jails and Detention Settings, in DRUG TREATMENT
AND CRIMINALJuSTICE 44, 47 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1993) ("The initial period of incarceration often serves to focus an inmate's attention on the negative consequences of substance
use and can mobilize internal motivation to address long-standing life-style problems
through treatment.").
281. Id. at 46-47.
282. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
283. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
284. Interview with Alan C. Woods III, supra note 7.
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The liberal skeptics, however, have also shown concern about the
expansion of treatment programs. 28 5 To a certain extent, they are
concerned that therapy is in itself punishment. 286 Certainly past
prison regimes, represented as being rehabilitative, have been shown
to be highly punitive.28 7
C. Drug Treatment Courts and Social Defense Themy
The pressure on American courts in recent years to do more for
the community with fewer resources 28 8 has produced a variety of
court-led reforms. It is not unheard of for judges to institute innovative approaches to criminal justice in individual courtrooms. 28 9 Perhaps unsurprisingly, very few of these efforts have paid particular
attention to the academic theoretical debate. Nevertheless, it is surprising that several innovations have seemed to fly directly in the face
of the prevailing retributive political currents. Thus, there is some
precedent for the emergence of courts with a similar approach to
DTCs.
Perhaps the most well-known example of this type of spontaneous, court-led reform is the "Earn-It" alternative sentencing program
begun in 1975 in Quincy, Massachusetts. 2 90 The Earn-It court's concept is quite simple, and today seems almost ordinary. Eligible convicted defendants are required to pay restitution to their victims.2 9 1
Unemployed defendants pay restitution by participating in community work programs.2 92 The most unusual part of this type of sentencing is that offenders who are unemployed are provided work directly
through the court itself.293 Work was initially provided by private
companies recruited from the community in a town hall-style
94
meeting.2
In keeping with the social defense theories proposed a few years
before, this court uses both incapacitative and rehabilitative meas285. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 276, at 97 (citing David Powelson &
Reinhard Bendix, Psychiatry in Prison, PSYCHIATRY (1951)).
286. Id.
287. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 46.
288. See GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at 9-10. But see Peters, supra note 280, at 73-75 for
sources of funding.
289. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 149.

290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. at 6-8 (illustrating the program with case studies).
Id. at 37-38.
See id. at 38 (explaining how the court places defendants into jobs); see also id. at 18-

19 (describing how the Earn-It program was instituted).

294. Id. at 18-20.
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ures. 9 5 On the rehabilitative side, Judge Albert L. Kramer used imaginative sentencing to attempt to convey to offenders the damage that
they were causing through their actions. 9 6 For example, two boys
who pulled a fire alarm in school paid restitution by painting the fire
house. Not only did they make up the cost of pulling the fire
alarm,2 9 7 but they spent substantial time at the fire station, which
29 8
helped them understand the cost of false alarms to the community.
In the language of social defense theory,2 99 the defendants came to
understand their responsibility for the crime. 0° On the incapacitative
side, they were supervised by members of the community and the
court while spending substantial hours at work. 0 1
The community orientation of the program is perhaps the hallmark of a social defense-style program. 0 2 Although officials are concerned with providing treatment to the offender and thereby enabling
the offender to return to society, 0 3 their primary focus is actually on
protecting the community.30 4 This style of looking to the future relationship of the defendants to society, 3°5 while at the same time attempting to protect society, is carried on in the DTCs of today.
As shown by the experience of the Earn-It court, the enormous
pressure to solve "the crime problem" while keeping costs low is not
new. A particularly vexing problem for court systems is created by the
enormous number of criminal cases, in particular drug cases.3 0 6 This
crush of cases creates pressure on all participants to process cases
through the system.30 7 Such mass-production methods of case
processing create a movement away from efforts to instill individual
responsibility in the law.30 8 As a result, offender-focused rehabilitation efforts have become luxuries in actual practice. 3"
295. See generallyALLEN,supra note 16 (on the rehabilitative ideal); id. at 66 (on incapacitation). See also supra notes 17, 25 and accompanying text.
296. KLEIN, supra note 149, at 8.
297. Id.

298. Id.
299. See generaly Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 132-39. See also supra notes

221-228 and accompanying text.
300. See Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 138.
301. KLEIN, supra note 149, at 8.
302. Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 138.

303. Id. at 133, 138.
304. Id. at 138.
305. Id. at 136.
306. RUSSELL

REPORT,

supra note 6, at 9, 12.

307. Boldt, supra note 129, at 2317.
308. Id. at 2316-17 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., CriminalJustice System: Overview, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE

309. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 30.

450, 454 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983)).
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The Earn-It court in Massachusetts sidestepped these very real
considerations by aligning itself with the community. The court
sought the approval and assistance of the community by explaining in
a mass meeting precisely what goals the court was seeking, how it expected to implement the goals, and what results the court was expecting."' In addition, the court successfully obtained favorable publicity
that furthered the court's agenda."'
The mass production of cases has led to a comprehensive debate,
numerous proposed solutions, and is an explicit factor in the rise of
DTCs. Currently in the political world, and even in the theoretical
world, retributionist theory seems to have gained the upper hand." t2
But in the trenches, driven by the crushing drug caseload, many jurisdictions have turned to DTCs in an attempt to stem recidivism and
slowly turn the tide of the overwhelming statistics. However, like their
Earn-It counterparts a decade before, DTC reform efforts are not
guided by theory. Practitioners in DTCs are guided by what they perceive to be working and they discard what does not work. 1 3
Nevertheless, there are certain underlying beliefs that inform the
DTC movement. Interestingly, they are primarily medical, rather than
legal. The modern catechism underlying the drug treatment court
movement is simple: Statistics and long-term observation demonstrate
a link between the use of drugs and crime. In particular, addictionthe compulsive, repeated use of drugs-leads to the repeated commission of crime to obtain proceeds for drugs. As the addict repeats
crimes, he progresses to the use of force or intimidation. If unchecked, DTC proponents assert, the use of force will ultimately result
in an act or acts of violence. The underlying source of the problemthe compulsive use of drugs-is not combated by traditional methods
of criminal justice. In fact, repeated cycles of incarceration could
help to teach addicts how to become more effective criminals. To
break the cycle of recidivism and crime, there must be effective treatment of addicts. DTCs are premised on the belief that an effective
way to get treatment for addicts is to use the power of the court to
31 4
force them into treatment.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 12-17.
312. See ALLEN, supra note 16, at 1-31 (discussing the decline of the rehabilitative theory). But seeAMERicAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 276, at 20 (claiming that "[d]uring
the last century the professed aims of criminal justice have changed from retribution to
rehabilitation and preventive imprisonment").
313. Id.
314. This catechism is the author's attempt to paraphrase numerous drug treatment

court ideals and principles. There is no single source that seems to grasp every portion of
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This catechism of DTCs clearly displays a powerful orientation toward a social defense-style organization."' 5 The primary goal, particularly from the criminal justice system's standpoint, is the ultimate
reduction of crime in the community. 3 16 Hidden in the subtext of
forcing defendants to undergo treatment is a high element of community supervision, particularly by the treatment agencies. Even before
defendants are allowed into the drug treatment
court, potentially dif3 17
ficult violent offenders are screened OUt.
Judges in treatment courts have not been reluctant to get other
community members involved.3 18 In Baltimore, Judge Jamey Weitzman asked one DTC offender who was doing well in the program to
give support to another offender by accompanying the second offender to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and to church. 3 19 One
DTC message is that every day an offender is in treatment is a day that
320
the offender is not committing crime on the streets.

As in the Earn-It model, DTCs also focus on the future health and
well-being of the defendant. By treating the disease of addiction, the
court benefits the defendant as much as the community. In fact,
more than any other court, DTCs are the epitome of a therapeutic or
medical approach to crime. Courts have long required offenders to
receive medical treatment of one kind or another.3 2 ' DTCs take this
notion one step further by becoming active participants in the treat3 22
ment of the defendant. The explicit reliance on disease theory
makes the DTC model conform even more closely to the ideals of
social defense theorists.3 23 Although the concept of guilt has not vanished, the DTCs attempt to sidestep the problem of determining
blame or fault through a plea-bargaining process. Thus in Baltimore
this catechism. HoweverJudge Tauber provides a similar perspective. See Tauber, Treating
Drug-Using Offenders, supra note 36.
315. See supra notes 221-228 and accompanying text for a discussion of social defense.
316. Id.
317. WILLAMS, supra note 34, at 7.
318. See Tauber, Treating Drug-Using Offenders, supra note 36, at 29. Earn-It provides a
model of alternative sentencing that similarly gets community members involved. See supra
notes 289-294 and accompanying text; see also WILLLAMS, supra note 34, at 18, and
GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at 7-8.
319. Author's observation of Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court, Judge Jamey Weitzman presiding, in Baltimore, Md. (Mar. 7, 1995).
320. Id.
321. See Roger H. Peters, Drug Treatment in Jails and Detention Settings, in 27 DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 44 (James A. Inciardi ed., Sage CriminalJustice Systems Annuals, 1993).
322. See supra notes 290-294 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 221-228 and accompanying text.
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City, the question of guilt is resolved or becomes irrelevant. 3 24 The
question then is no longer whether the crime happened, but rather,
what is compelling the crime and how do we stop it? As Barbara
Wootton imagined, this question is resolved by treatment
personnel. 2 5
The focus on this question is even more evident when one considers the level of integration of legal, correctional, and medical systems
involved in the DTC process. While the court retains ultimate decision-making power, in all cases the sentence is some form of treatment. The judge relies on the advice of treatment personnel to
decide what type and how much treatment is appropriate and even
where treatment will be performed. 2 6 Corrections officials ensure
that treatment is carried out.327 This integration of three formerly

diverse fields has been referred to as an "integrated systems approach.'1 2' Although technical boundaries remain, the integration of
medical, correctional, and legal systems is far-reaching enough that
one can say the "withering away" of the distinction envisioned by Barbara Wootton 3 ' has already taken place in the Baltimore City court.
The institution of graduated sanctions for offenders who are not
making satisfactory progress further demonstrates the social defense
model in action.3 3 0 Thus, within the DTC, sanctions are not punishment. They are simply "adjustments," a device by which the court
teaches addicts responsibility for their actions.33 t Judge Jamey Weitzman highlighted this tendency:
The defendants are in drug court because they are addicted
to substances. Therefore, dirty urines are not unusual. The
court is concerned that these defendants continue to follow
program regulations and rules and attempt to strenuously
324. It is important to remember that there are two tracks. If the defendant enters
though the probation track, the defendant already admitted guilt. If the defendant enters

through the stet track, the question of guilt is put off indefinitely. See supra text accompanying notes 119-127.
325. See generally Woo-rTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILrIY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146.
326. GOLDKAMp, supra note 34, at 7.

327. WILLAMS, supra note 34, at 3 (referring to Baltimore's program).
328. Telephone interview with Judge Jeffrey Tauber, president of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (Jan. 17, 1996).
329. Lady Wootton uses the phrase "withering away" in reference to the concept of responsibility. Woo-roN, CRIME, REsPoNsIBILrry, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 169.
330. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, app. H at 2-3.
331. Id. app. H at 3. The use of the word "adjustments" rather than "sanctions" is interesting. In the context of the program, a manager makes adjustments to the supervision
regimen that the offender undergoes. However, use of the word adjustments also displays
the belief in the malleability of character that is at the heart of rehabilitation theory; presumably, the offender will suitably adjust to become more compliant.

1996]

DRUG TREATMENT COURT

503

address their addiction. If they continue positively, the court
will work with them. However when they fail to comply with
program requirements, such as missing treatment sessions,
then the court will show them that there are consequences to
their behavior and impose some form of increased
supervision.3 3 2
The result is a type of separation of drug use from criminality that is
highly clinical in outlook. In contrast, in a strict legal sense, failure of
a urinalysis test
could result in a violation of probation and
33 3
punishment.
As shown above, some DTC offenders experience greater criminal justice system involvement than the ordinary nonviolent offender
in a like position. 334 As in other indeterminate sentencing situations,
it is a peculiar phenomenon that the time for treatment can be far
longer than the jail sentence normally given. 333 The probability of
receiving jail time and years of court-enforced treatment could serve
to mollify those who favor punishment over other competing goals.
Although the systems approach3 3 6 used by the DTC model in conjunction with the medical concept of the disease of addiction seems
particularly apt for drug and alcohol addicts, the model clearly has
implications beyond the DTC structure. In Michigan, for example,
Washtenaw County uses the systems approach to coordinate courts
with law enforcement in the area of domestic violence.3 3 7 However,
one does not see a movement toward specialized courts for other
types of crimes such as "environmental" or "white collar crimes"
courts. Thus far, court officials have attempted the systems approach
only where there seems to be some form of medical pathology, such as
addiction or battered spouse syndrome.3 3 ' Given the critique of indeterminate sentencing3 39 and officials' justifiable concerns about releasing dangerous offenders, the medical condition and partnership
with treatment authorities may provide cover for the difficult decisions officials are called upon to make. 40
332. Interview with Judge Jamey Weitzman, supra note 14.
333. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1957).
334. See supra notes 266-270 and accompanying text.
335. Id.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 326-328.
337. Charles J. Pope, Domestic Violence and The Courts-The Systems Approach, 73 MICH. B.
J. 946 (1994).
338. See id. at 946.
339. See supra notes 254-258 and accompanying text.
340. Of course, officials are also reacting to the overwhelming number of drug cases in
their jurisdiction as well. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
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To the extent that DTCs are politically savvy, the lack of theoretical input has not yet proven serious. Like the "Earn-It" court,3 4 ' DTCs
have taken pains to keep public relations positive and to maintain
community involvement. 342 For example, in Baltimore City, the media were invited to the first graduation of DTC offenders.3 4 3 A steady
stream of studies has been released by the DTC movement to show
that the DTCs are working. 3 44 The message remains simple. Almost
every advocate of DTCs has a remarkably similar approach to the subject: "The old system of dealing with addicted offenders does not
work (is in crisis); prevention and treatment are the only alternatives."3 45 By worrying about community safety first, the DTC movement, like the Earn-It court, aligns itself with the community. 4 Thus
far, the specialized courts compare favorably to the old system, despite
the high level of hostility toward rehabilitative goals.
There remain substantial questions about the legal system from
the DTC perspective. Parts III and IV are devoted to exploring some
of these concepts in the context of the DTC.
III.

THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Many social defense theorists-having advocated the elimination
of punishment in favor of treatment-question the role of traditional
court systems as well.147 This criticism stems from the very nature of
the criminal justice system.3 48 If the goal of the criminal justice system
is ultimately to assign blame and punishment, it is fair to say that the
system reaches those goals through the method of the adversarial system.3 4 9 As such, the system's goals are to divine the truth of criminal
341. See supra notes 290-294, 301-305, 310-311 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
343. Telephone interview withJudgeJamey Weitzman, District CourtJudge for the State
of Maryland (Jan. 17, 1996).
344. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 2, at 13-15.
345. See GOLDAMP, supra note 34, at 4; see also Tauber, Treating Drug-Using Offenders,
supra note 36, at 30.

346. This concern for community safety is most clearly evidenced by the use of assessment indexes to weed out riskier defendants. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying
text; see also supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text (discussing DTCs' community
orientation).
347. Marc Ancel, Social Defense: The Future of Penal Reform, in 16 COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
LAw PROJECT (Edward M. Wise ed., Thorsten Sellin trans., 1987) [hereinafter Ancel, Social
Defense]; Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 138-39; see also supra notes 237-244 and
accompanying text.
348. SeeAncel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 138 (discussing the need for a "humanization of criminal law and the criminal trial").
349. For an explanation of the adversarial system, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 67-93 (1988).

1996]

DRUG TREATMENT COURT

505

matters3 5 0 and to protect defendants from the power of the state.3 5 '
But if the goals of social defense are protection of the community and
reform through treatment of offenders, the adversarial system cer3 52
tainly seems to become less important, if not inappropriate.
Section A, below, provides a short overview of the adversarial system, with particular attention paid to social defense criticisms. Section B will describe the adversarial system as it operates in the drug
treatment court. In particular, the changed roles of the court participants will be discussed. The role of the judge has expanded and
broadened, while roles of both advocates have diminished. This Comment argues that defense lawyers face several pitfalls in defining their
duty to clients. The team concept fostered by the systems approach
forces defenders to walk a fine line between their legal duty to defend
their clients under the adversary system and the systemic duty to help
their clients by not obstructing DTC treatment.
A.

A General Description of the Adversary System

The development of an adversary system of adjudication by Anglo-American jurisprudence may be fairly described as one part accident and one part tradition.3 53 As such, the system has frequently
been criticized, particularly with respect to mental illness and its relationship to the law.3 54 Considering that it has survived since its inception shortly after the Norman invasion of England,3 5 5 it has fervent
defenders as well.
David Luban states that there are three main components of interest in an adversary system of law.5 5 6 First is the system of rules and
procedure that each member of the court must uphold. 5 7 Of more
importance for the purposes of this Comment is the burden on each
interest or party to present his own case. Given the intricacies of the
system of rules, 58 most parties to a case are represented by lawyers,
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 68-74.
Id. at 67-93.
See infra text accompanying note 374.
LuBAN, supra note 349, at 67.

354. See, e.g., 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DtsABILrr LAw: CrIVL AND CRIMINAL §§ 8.02,

8.20 (1989).
355. LUBAN, supra note 349, at 67.
356. Id. at 56-57.
357. Id. at 57.
358. In Luban's characterization of the adversary system, the rules in themselves are a
third component of the adversary system. Id. They are de-emphasized in this paper to
better focus on the roles of the advocates and the judge whose changing roles in DTC are
of particular interest.
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who in turn act as partisans on behalf of their clients. 5 9 The final
important component is a neutral judge who acts as the binding referee over the parties.3 6 ° As Professor Luban notes, given the theoretical neutrality, if not the passivity, of the judge, this structure is
typically characterized more by the relationships of lawyers to their
clients rather than by the "structure of adjudication." 6 '
Numerous commentators have attempted to justify the adversarial system of adjudication both politically and legally since its inception."' A few of the more persuasive arguments follow. First, some
argue, the adversary system is a safeguard against totalitarian political
systems.3 63 This is an interesting point, applying mainly to criminal
defense.36 4 Underlying the argument is a sense that the safeguards
put in place against the government create advantages for those in the
defensive role. 63 This is a striking observation because, as Luban
notes, these advantages are routinely bypassed through the plea-bargaining process. 36 In some commentators' views, however, the pressure to plea bargain comes because the defendants have so many
advantages; prosecutors recognize that if there were no plea bargains,
the criminal justice system would grind to a halt.36 7
A similar point is that the system exists to protect the legal rights
of defendants. 3 6 An apt comparison would be to people playing a
game.3 6 9 The rules of the game are provided to each player, who
seeks to maximize his position within the rules. The game is entirely
self-referential. Although there is an objective truth beyond the game,
determining the winner or loser pertains only within the game. Thus,
if a player does other than what is in the rules, he has stepped outside
of the game and the rules may be enforced against him. In this context, the use of the adversary system is said to produce the most vigorous exercise of the rules. In comparison, others claim that the clash
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 67.
363. Id. at 58.
364. Id. at 59.
365. Id. at 60.
366. Id.
367. Id. (referring to the opinion ofJohn Langbein).
368. Id. at 74.
369. Wootton quotes from Ludovic Kennedy, who also compared the adversary system
to a game. See WooTroN, CRIME AND PENAL POLICY, supra note 25, at 19-20 (quoting from
LUDOVIc KENNEDY, THE TaAL OF STEPHAN WARD 251 (1964)). Carrie Menkel-Meadow also
uses game metaphors. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. RE%,. 754 (1984).
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of viewpoints is the best system for ferreting out the objective truth of
37 1
a situation. 370 Studies are inconclusive on this point.

Finally, Professor Luban's own justification along pragmatic lines
is illuminating. He relies on a three part argument. One, there is no
evidence that the adversary system does a worse job at determining
truth than any other existing system. Two, a system of adjudication is
a necessity. Three, it is the way we have always done things.3 72 As he
asserts, any replacement necessarily carries the risk of unexpected and
unwanted change, and therefore " [ w]hy, then, go through the trauma
37
of change?"

3

The answer for drug treatment court personnel and for social defense theorists is simple: There is a better system. In their opinion,
the adversarial system is a game that must be played according to certain prescribed rules. Consequently, it has nothing to do with finding
the truth of a question. Rather, in this model, the adversary system is
about the enforcement of legal rights.37 4
In the social defense model, however, it is necessary to determine
causality before establishing actual responsibility. 375 As has been suggested, this could be accomplished in a separate proceeding. The degree of the defendant's responsibility will then determine what level
of treatment and supervision the defendant requires. Therefore, in
this system, which essentially attempts to predict the future dangerousness of a defendant, legal rights are not meaningful. 376 Finding the
truth is what is important, and to the extent that the adversarial rules
prevent the full truth of causality from being known, the system must
be sacrificed.
This does not seem quite adequate. An underlying problem that
proponents of community-based rehabilitation methods might point
to is the nature of the adversary system. Because of the principle of
partisanship, the system necessarily makes adversaries of parties who
may have a greater interest in cooperating.3 7 7 To the extent that the
goals of treatment are cooperative rather than competitive, the adversary system is a particularly inappropriate method to effect treatment.
If the dynamic of adversariness forces a win or a loss for each side, the
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

LUBAN, supra note 349, at 74.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 74.
WooTrON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 170.

Ancel, New Social Defense, supra note 225, at 43.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 369, at 759-61.
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system itself creates the assignment of blame and punishment for the
loser.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes this dynamic as a zero-sum
game. 78 In this model, individuals maximize gain in an individual
manner. 379 The adversary process simplifies complex issues into what
appears to be a single issue: buy low, sell high.38 " This is true even in
the context of criminal negotiations .3' For example, a prosecutor
typically starts plea negotiations with a high offer, the defense attorney
goes low. Ultimately they are seeking the right "price" of the crime."8 2
If DTCs were adversarial, the prosecutor and defense attorney
would constantly be seeking to price, or to value, treatment (as opposed to punishment). 83 This assumes that treatment is necessarily
valued as a commodity at the same level by both parties and that
agreement can be reached.38 4 On its face, this is not correct. Even
assuming that the value a prosecutor places on treatment remains
constant, the value placed on treatment by a defendant will vary as he
learns more about treatment. For example, a defendant who has
maintained sobriety for six months values treatment differently than a
defendant who is just entering the program. It is possible to envision
a series of negotiations, as defendants become more familiar with the
court and treatment. However, if a defendant spends his time haggling over the value of treatment, he will not be receiving treatment
and indeed may remain resistant to treatment altogether.
For the social defense theorist, the goal is to protect the community and to treat the offender.38 3 Neither goal is served by playing a
zero-sum game that creates winners and losers and thus affixes blame.
Blame is particularly inappropriate for those individuals who are incapacitated by disease. 8 6 Rather, the answer is to treat or incapacitate
defendants so that they cannot further harm the community. More
plainly, this criticism stems from competing visions of what the justice
378. Id. at 787.
379. Id. at 784.

380. Id.
381. Id. at 785-87.
382. Id. at 784. Menkel-Meadow explains that "there is only one issue, price," in the
adversarial process. Id.
383. Menkel-Meadow explains that the second major assumption in the adversarial process is "that both parties desire equally and exclusively the thing by which that issue is
measured." Id.
384. Id.
385. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
386. See WOOT-rON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILIY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 169-70
(arguing that we are incapable of telling which acts are a disease or compulsion and so all
offenders should receive treatment); see also supra text accompanying note 237.
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system should do; the goals of punitive systems are different from
those of social defense.3 8 7 An adversary system may be appropriate for
punishment, but given its capacity to interfere with the treatment process, it is not appropriate for treatment.
This frustration with competing goals is aptly captured in a system
proposed by Warren Burger, speaking on insanity before he became
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he jury would decide . . . only whether [the accused]

committed the overt acts charged....
[I]f some mental disorder or illness appears to have precluded the accused from forming a criminal intent, the court
alone would deal with that question ....

The courts could

employ a hearing process but not in the conventional adversary sense of "dog eat dog and the devil take the hindmost."
Rather this hearing would be an occasion for psychiatrists to
present as full and complete a personality profile as could be
developed....

From all this the trial judge would then decide the best
course (a) for the protection of society, (b) for the protection of the defendant, and (c) for the rehabilitation of the
defendant.3 88
Finally, there is the question of protection against totalitarianism.3 8 9 This is an important question that has dogged much of the
work of social defense theory. In Nazi Germany, laws reminiscent of
the social defense philosophy were propagated, requiring the reform
of "'responsibility based on character."' 9 ° Social defense theorists
would argue that the Nazi concept of "reform" was unscientific,
whereas their rehabilitation is scientifically based and humane.3 9 1 As
Herbert Fingarette pointed out, this assertion is open to criticism:
"[T]o turn the question over to the experts amounts to turning the
387. See WOOTTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 172; see
also supra notes 221-228 and accompanying text.
388. HERBERT FINGARETrE. THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANIY 4 n.12 (1972) [hereinafter FINGARETIE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANrrY] (quoting Warren E. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 FED. PROBATION 3, 9 (1964)).

389. See Ancel, Social Defense, supra note 347, at 63-67 (discussing totalitarianism and
social defense). Ancel claims that "totalitarian regimes put primary emphasis on retributive and intimidating punishment." Id. at 64.
390. SILVING, supra note 247, at 141 (quoting the Charakterschuldof National Socialism).
For an overview of National Socialist doctrine in the context of social defense and of the
effects of Nazism on the development of social defense theory, see Ancel, Social Defense,

supra note 347, at 63-72.
391. See, e.g., WOOTTON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILIY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 17172.
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person over to the experts.... [This] reflects a dangerous faith in the
combination of good will and claimed expertise." 392 Drug Treatment
Court personnel suggest, nevertheless, that in the intervening time
since the development of social defense theory and its criticism, the
science of addiction treatment has greatly improved. 93
B.

Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court

As shown above, altering the basic goals of the criminal justice
system can have profound consequences on the structure of the system. 3 94 The abandonment of punishment and blame as outcomes of
the system are likely to result in some rethinking, if not actual adjustment of the system. Although driven primarily by the need to manage
exceptionally high caseloads, rather than ideological commitment to
a particular theory such as social defense,3 9 5 DTCs have typically
found it necessary to de-emphasize the adversarial system in whole or
396
in part.

This de-emphasis is partly the result of adopting a medical view of
addiction.3 9 7 By placing treatment at the center of the rehabilitative
sentencing process of the court, the court finds it necessary to create a
system that is cooperative.3 98 Although it is possible to suggest that
the medical and legal systems could be integrated within an adversarial process, it is difficult to envision a medical system that uses an
adversary process to treat its patients.
Consequently, the Baltimore City DTC has essentially adopted
the bifurcated procedure hinted at by Barbara Wootton3 99 and Chief
Justice Burger.40 ' As noted above, the court essentially sidesteps the
need for a lengthy inquiry into guilt through a screening process.40 1
The use of plea bargaining results in defendants on the probation
40 2
track, who have already admitted guilt, appearing before the court.

Defendants on the diversionary track are not usually required to ad392.

FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY, supra note 388, at 5.
393. For a variety of approaches to and studies of addiction and its treatment, see generally VISIONS OF ADDICTION (Stanton Peele ed., 1988), Ailing, supra note 51, at 402-15, and

Lowinson et al., supra note 50, at 550-61.
394. See supra part II.

395. See supra text accompanying note 306.
396. See supra notes 118-135 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at ii-vi.

399. WooT-rON, CRIME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND PREVENTION, supra note 146, at 168; see also
supra notes 235-237 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
402. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 17.
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mit guilt; however, typically they have admitted to drug use and they
have been diagnosed as addicts as part of the screening process.4"'
Until a treatment contract is signed, the offender is technically
still participating in the adversary system, although members of the
system are cooperating to get the offender into the program. This
stage is absolutely critical. While still under the adversary system, the
defender has the duty to fully inform his client of the legal risks that
the client is taking by entering into the nonadversary system. 4 This
necessity certainly creates tensions for the defender. First, the defender's duty to his client is to show the client precisely what the outcomes will be, both in and out of the DTC. °5 Second, the defender
must act as the interface between the client and the DTC.4 °6 This
position places some stress on the defender to act as an advocate for
drug treatment, particularly for a defender who is involved with the
DTC. Despite the tension, it would seem that at this stage, any error
must be made toward the partisan duty to fully inform the client of his
options.
Once the client has entered the system, the second stage of DTC
begins." Florida's Office of the State Courts Administrator has prepared a chart that is quite useful in showing the altered status of the
court at this stage." ° After the defendant has entered into the system,
only the assignment to treatment and the long process of followup
remain. In Baltimore, as in all DTCs, this stage of the process is specifically nonadversarial.4 °9
403. See supra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
404. MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1995). The rule reads:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the presentation.
The Maryland rule is cited because this Comment is concerned with the Baltimore DTC.
However, most jurisdictions have equivalent rules.
405. See id. This principle is stated even more clearly in the preamble to the Maryland
rules: "As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's
legal rights and obligations, and explains their practical implications." MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1995).
406. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 14.
407. See supra notes 130-145 and accompanying text.
408. TREATMENT BASED DRUG COURTS, supra note 38, at 6.
409. See WItAMS, supra note 34, at 17. Although rare, there are other examples of
nonadversarial proceedings in American jurisprudence. Most notably, until 1966, when
the United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), the juvenile
courts in the United States were nonadversarial. In Gault, the Supreme Court limited a
juvenile court's discretion after that court sentenced ajuvenile to what amounted to a six-

year term at a state industrial school for placing lewd telephone calls. Id. at 7-8, 30-31. The
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TABLE I
TRADITIONAL COURT

TREATMENT BASED DRUG

Individuals representing entities
within the criminal justice system
to achieve the goal
Adversarial

Court team working together to
achieve the goal

(TREATMENT) COURT

Goal = "Legal Justice"

Court has limited role in
supervision of defendant
Treatment programs of variable
lengths and intensity
Relapse = new crime or violation
of probation = enhanced sentence

Nonadversarial
Goal = Restore defendant as a
productive, noncriminal member
of society
Court plays integral role in
monitoring defendant's progress
in treatment
Individualized, but intensive and
structured, treatment programs
Graduated sanctions imposed in
response to noncompliance with
drug court program

The move to a nonadversarial system profoundly affects the roles
of almost every participant in the courtroom, including defendants.
Following a juvenile court example, it is possible to see a situation in
which defendants are treated almost as wards of the court. More important, the roles of the advocates and the judge shift dramatically.
The prosecutor's role in the DTC has perhaps changed the least
of all three participants. During the first stage, the prosecutor is active in determining which offenders are eligible for treatment.4 1 ° In
the second stage, treatment and followup, if the offender is doing
well, the prosecutor is typically passive.4 1 1 If the offender has missed
meetings or has otherwise violated the treatment contract, the judge
typically asks the prosecutor to suggest a sanction.4" This situation
would suggest a slight return to an adversarial process. However, the
dynamics of the DTC are such that at this point everyone is considered to be on the same team. Consequently, there is typically little for
the prosecutor to do.
similar offense by an adult carried a maximum penalty of $50 or two months in jail. Id. at
8-9.
410. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 8-17; CARSON, supra note 108, at 1-3.
411. See WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 18-20 (indicating State's Attorney involvement during treatment only if offender cannot be controlled in the program).
412. Telephone interview with Deborah Hermann, supra note 6. Ms. Hermann notes
that on occasion some DTCjudges turn to treatment or probation personnel for this function as well.
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The defender's role in DTC is typically passive as well.4 1 However, this passivity conceals a difficult burden: How may a defender
combine status as a full, working member of an integrated treatment
team, while remaining an effective lawyer for the defendant? There
does not seem to be a perfect answer to this question.
During the first stage of the DTC process, admission, the defender acts as the interface between the defendant and the DTC.41 4
During this stage the defender may ask the State's Attorney to include
a particular client.4 15 The defender is also responsible for ensuring
that the client fully understands the contract to be signed.4 1 6 In particular, there is a real need to help the client weigh the value of a
small, relatively short jail term against the possibility of longer involvement with the DTC. This DTC involvement could include shock incarceration and, in the case of complete failure, imposition of a
or a trial and possible sensentence for probation-track defendants
4 17
tence for diversion-track defendants.
The second stage is in some ways even more difficult. Having
gained informed consent during the first stage, the defender is reduced to passivity in most situations. Typically, the judge bypasses
both lawyers and talks directly to the client. 418 This can lead to complications, especially because clients can become emotional when talking about certain aspects of their lives. As with the prosecutor, the
defender will revert somewhat to the adversary system if a client is in
violation of a contract, and the defender will typically seek to clarify
41
the status of the client.

9

Generally the defender will argue for leniency if a client is sent to
shock incarceration. By definition, however, the defender is part of
the systems approach team and is also responsible for treating the client. Therefore, because shock incarceration is defined as treatment,
the defender has incentives to mute his dissent. Often the defender is
reduced to making arguments destined to be disregarded, and there-

413. SeeWILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 18-20 (calling for Public Defender involvement during treatment only if the contract is violated).
414. See id. at 8-17 (referring to defenders' various responsibilities in the initial process).
415. Id.
416. See supra notes 404-405 and accompanying text.
417. WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at app. G, app. H.
418. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
419. Author's observation of Baltimore City DTC, supra note 319.
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fore there is no incentive to interfere with the treatment. Consequently, the defender has shifted from partisan zeal to cooperation.420
The role of the trial judge is changed dramatically in the DTC.
Instead of being a neutral arbiter, the judge becomes the center of
courtroom attention.4 2 1 The judge simultaneously must convey interest in the offender, while reinforcing desirable traits in offenders and
giving sanctions for failures.4 2 Some of the roles the judge assumes
include: "confessor, task master, cheerleader and mentor, in turn exhorting, threatening, encouraging and congratulating the participant
for his or her progress or lack thereof. 4' 2' The judge does not interact with the single defendant in a vacuum. Instead, the judge plays
each role in front of an audience of DTC offenders, 4 24 each of whom
learns from the judge's performance what is expected of them.
Finally, it is the judge's leadership that is most responsible for
running an effective DTC unit.4 2' The judge is required to ensure
that each piece is in place, and frequently must coordinate the medi4 26
cal, legal, and correctional systems.
The shift to a nonadversarial system has had profound effects on
the roles of each member of the criminal justice system. In particular,
the discretion of the court as a whole is exceedingly high. To the
extent that the judge grants a portion of his discretion to treatment
personnel, the nature of treatment is then tainted by the criticisms
against broad judicial discretion. Treatment has been critiqued both
for ineffectiveness and because it is used as a substitute for punishment.427

The granting of discretion creates a situation in which

judges must police themselves. Failure to do so, coupled with the type
of mass production of cases that propelled the creation of the DTC in
the first place, could lead to abuses.4 28
Nevertheless, liberal critics are in a difficult position as well. Particularly with respect to the narcotics issue, legalization is not a viable
option. As such, addiction treatment is one alternative to the repressive measures espoused by supporters of the war theory of punish420. There is of course some level of cooperation in any proceeding, particularly among

lawyers who repeatedly must work opposite each other. See Donald G. Gifford, A ContextBased Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 75 (1985).
421. GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at iv, 6.

422. Id.
423. Tauber, Treating Drug-Using Offenders, supra note 36, at 29.

424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. PEELE, supra note 154, at 221-26.
428. See supra note 409.
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ment. 429

Careful review of social defense theory may provide
philosophical input for DTCs in the coming years as well.
IV.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR DRUG TREATMENT COURTS

The Drug Treatment Court concept has been enthusiastically embraced by many individuals and jurisdictions around the country.4"'
In December 1993 the First National Drug Court Conference was held
in Miami, Florida, attracting more than 400 individuals.4 3 1 As a result
of that meeting, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals
was formed, and became operational on May 10, 1994.432 The Associ-

ation is currently headed by an early proponent of DTCs, Judge Jeffrey Tauber of the Oakland, California, DTC.4 3 The Association's
purpose is to help create interest and funding on a national level for
drug treatment courts.43 4
The working paper produced at the first conference reflected
enough confidence about the strength of DTCs to refer to their
proliferation as a "Drug Treatment Court Movement."43 5 DTCs also
have been powerfully championed by United States Attorney General
Janet Reno who, as the Dade County State's Attorney, played a role in
creating the Miami DTC.43 6 Her presence as U.S. Attorney General
should be heartening to DTC proponents.
Nevertheless, there are storm clouds on the horizon. Operational concerns have been raised about drug courts. In particular, the
Miami DTC has been subjected to administrative review because of
concerns regarding "net-widening, " 4 7 a process of allowing a larger
class of defendants into the program. Critics say that this process allows dangerous defendants to join the program and thus escape more
438
serious punishment.
To date, much of the DTCs' attraction has been as an alternative
to the punitive sentencing philosophy of the most recent cycle of the
drug war. Criticism of mandatory sentencing and of "get tough"
429. See supra notes 56-83 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

431.

GOLDKAMP,

supra note 34, at i.

432. Telephone interview with Marc Pearce, Deputy Director of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (Jan. 16, 1996).
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. GOLDKAMP, supra note 34, at i.
436. Id.
437. Jeff Leen & Don Van NattaJr., Drug CourtFavoredBy Felons, MitAi HERt.u., Aug. 29,
1994, at Al.
438. Id.
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measures may be financially prudent or philosophically sound, but
DTCs may have to prove positive results before legislators begin to
flock to their standard. Indeed, the continuing "war on drugs"
mentality demonstrates that "treatment works" has not settled into the
popular mindset of criminal justice personnel, much less the voting
public.
Studies have indicated some reasons for cautious optimism. A
study of Judge Tauber's Oakland court found that the DTC may have
dropped the "felony recidivism" rate forty-six percent while getting a
number of addicts to stop taking drugs (at least in the short-term)."'
Another benefit was a savings of $2 million in jail costs." 0
However, the treatment approach of DTCs is clearly at odds with
the current political atmosphere. Although the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized $150 million in
funding for DTCs in 1996, 4 ' this funding is in jeopardy because of
deficit reduction efforts." 2 Thus, the atmosphere is running against
federal funding of these programs. However, some federal funds are
being allocated in block grants that would allow the state to fund DTC
programs if they choose." 3 Despite election-year rhetoric, however,
DTCs are not likely to be opposed, so much as neglected.
The Baltimore City DTC is funded approximately through 1997,
with several opportunities to renew or to seek new funding. 4' The
political climate in Maryland has been relatively supportive of DTCs in
the past, largely because the case has been made that DTCs save
money.4 45 The current governor's administration supports the DTC
concept, 446 and indeed DTC committee members hope that there will

439. Fred Setterberg, Drug Court: Oakland Tries a Carrot-and-StickApproach to Keeping FirstTime Drug Offenders Out ofJail, CAL. LAW., May 1994, at 58, 62.
440. Id.
441. Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 50001, § 2201, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
442. Most recently, Congress passed an appropriations bill that eliminated specific
funds for DTCs, and President Clinton vetoed it. CONG. REc. S18134 (daily ed. Dec. 7,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings). Congress passed a temporary spending bill funding
DTCs at 75% of 1995 levels. See House Votes for 45-Day Funding,BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 1996, at
Al. At the time of this writing, future funding for DTCs is uncertain.
443. 134 CONG. REC. H1659-1664 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mfume).
444. See supra note 15.
445. Telephone interview with David W. Skeen, past president of the Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City, Member of the Russell Committee and Drug Treatment Court Committee (Jan.
17, 1996).
446. Telephone interview with Adam Gelb, senior policy advisor to the lieutenant governor of Maryland (Jan. 17, 1996).
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be relatively good bipartisan legislative support for the program stem44 7
ming from broad criminal justice and community-based support.
In addition, the Baltimore DTC is on something of a roll. It has
maintained very strict standards for entry into the program and seems
unlikely to be forced into "net-widening"" 8 without serious discussion
of the ramifications. Although admissions to the program began
slowly, the program has developed enough momentum to completely
fill 1500 treatment beds by the end of the year." 9 The graduation of
the first class of defendants gave the DTC a relatively high profile in
the Baltimore City criminal justice system.
The Baltimore court, like other DTCs, is not a fad. If Judge
Weitzman is correct, it is a model for a new form ofjustice, a systemic
approach that coordinates all available resources to create support for
individuals as they re-enter the community. The Quincy, Massachusetts, "Earn-It" Court shows that the alignment of a court with the interests of the community is possible. 45 0 In that jurisdiction, the court
system turned to the entire community to join in the rehabilitation
effort. 45 1
Baltimore's systemic approach is aimed more specifically at
achieving integration among the legal, medical, and correctional communities. Although the specialized courts have not yet reached beyond the courtroom in a specific way, the concept of community is
very important to DTC operations. Judge Weitzman, the first Baltimore City DTC judge, inquired into many facets of offenders' lives,
including employment, health, and family life.45 2 In fact, as shown,
the judge is familiar with each defendant in an almost parental role.
Although there is common ground and resonance between the
DTCs and social defense theory,45 3 current practitioners seem very reluctant to make theoretical claims. This seems to be justified on a
political basis. However, as the recent rescission of funding indicates,
simply being a good working program may not be enough. Indeed,
447. For example, the Baltimore Coalition Against Substance Abuse (BCASA), a broadbased coalition of health, charitable business, professional, neighborhood, government,
and religious organizations has been promoting the drug court with the public and political decisionmakers for two years. Interview with David W. Skeen, supra note 94. In some
cases this organization has provided financial support for nonfunded needs such as bus

tokens for participants. Id. Thus there is a strong infrastructure for the Baltimore City
DTC. Id.
448. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
449. Interview with Robb McFaul, supra note 115.
450. See supra notes 288-305 and accompanying text.
451. Id.
452. Author's observation of Baltimore City DTC, supra note 319.
453. See supra notes 225-264 and accompanying text.
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the rehabilitative movement has faltered on practical grounds in the
past.4 54 Failure to show substantial concrete results may hasten the

demise of DTCs. For this reason, despite the great enthusiasm of
practitioners in the DTCs, excessive claims should be avoided. Indeed, it may be time for proponents to take another look at legal theory to see if it can be used to their advantage.
Finally, despite the very real funding problems, DTCs are not
likely to disappear. The practical problems of court administration
that drive the DTC movement remain and may actually be intensified
by new aggressive criminal justice activities. Punitive sentencing and
law enforcement practices aimed at the casual or addicted drug-user
increase defendant populations beyond the capacity of the criminal
justice system and its jail programs. The DTC in this context is, at the
least, a good supervisory program for this population. In Baltimore,
the focus of the DTC on the community continues to align the community interest with rehabilitative and social defense goals. As long as
this alignment is maintained, the community should continue to support the DTC into its third year and beyond.
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